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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License
Stanley Tweyman
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DOI:10.17265/2159-5313/2025.01.006
York University, Toronto, Canada
In Part 2 of David Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Cleanthes puts forth the analogical Argument from Design, the argument intended to establish that the designer of the world possesses an intelligence similar to human intelligence, in light of Cleanthes’ claim that the design of the world resembles machines of human contrivance. Philo argues that this argument fails, because the world does not bear a specific resemblance to any type of machine, and, therefore, there is no basis for reasoning analogically to an intelligent cause of design. In Part 3, Cleanthes attempts to strengthen his case through two illustrative analogies: I will examine the first of these—the Articulate Voice speaking from the clouds. Scholarship generally regards the Articulate Voice illustration to fail, precisely because nothing in this illustrative analogy assists Philo in understanding that the world is a machine. My paper/talk reveals that Philo provides additional criticisms of the Articulate Voice illustration in Parts 6 and 7 of the Dialogues, which make Philo’s critique even stronger and more enlightening regarding his critical approach to the Design Argument than can be learned from Part 2 alone.
Argument from Design, illustrative
analogy, causal reasoning
Stanley Tweyman. (2025). The Failure of the First Illustrative Analogy in Part 3 of David Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion
Hume, D. (1991). Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Stanley Tweyman, (Ed.). London and New York: Routledge.
Smith, N. K. (1947). Dialogues. Nashville: Thomas Nelson & Sons LTD.