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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License
Juichi Inada
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DOI:10.17265/2328-2134/2024.06.002
Senshu University, Tokyo, Japan
There has been widespread cooperation and intervention by the international community in the reconstruction of post-conflict countries, and maintaining security and stability and assistance for economic recovery and development have been positioned as two indispensable wheels (Security-Development Nexus) in the rebuilding process of unstable countries. One of the most typical examples of the international community's involvement in post-conflict state-building was its support for Afghanistan after 2002. However, despite its efforts over 20 years, the Taliban seized all of Afghanistan in 2021, resulting in the collapse of 20 years of international community support for the building of a democratic state. This paper attempts to recapitulate the international community’s ambitious 20-year Security and Development efforts in Afghanistan, where the resulting failure lies and what lessons can be learned. The key points are: (1) the limitations of the UN’s role and the fact that it had continued to provide assistance without a clear “exit strategy”, (2) the security circle and the development circle had different objectives, and their collaboration was not effectively conducted, (3) the failure to include Taliban in the initial political process of the new state.
Security-Development Nexus, State-Building, Afghanistan, UNAMA, NSP, PRT, Taliban, exit strategy
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