

An Insoluble Problem: The Harding-Makarios Negotiations, Turkey, and the Cause of Cypriot Enosis

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Early in the Cyprus Emergency, Governor John Harding and Archbishop Makarios began a series of negotiations aimed at bringing about a peaceful resolution to the violence. The contentious discussions centered on two divisive issues: the political autonomy of a Cyprus freed from British rule, and the position of Turkey on the island. Though it seemed to both official and unofficial circles that a negotiated agreement was within reach, a last minute display of brinkmanship by Makarios derailed the potential agreement. Harding ordered the Archbishop's arrest and focused on coercive measures against Greek-Cypriot nationalists. Makarios was taken into exile and violence on Cyprus escalated to new heights. The failure of dialogue condemned Cyprus to further years of war and conflict and highlighted the apparently irreconcilable political divisions which would plague the island for decades to come.

Keywords: Greek-Cypriot nationalists, negotiations

Introduction

On 4th October 1955, the day after his arrival in Cyprus, the new governor, Field Marshal Sir John Harding, met with Archbishop Makarios to begin negotiations to resolve the violence plaguing the island. Six months earlier, the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters had begun a campaign for *enosis* — the unification of Cyprus with Greece — with targeted attacks on British security forces. Described by historian Robert Holland as “one of the most protracted and complex exchanges in the history of British decolonization” (1998, p. 85), the Harding-Makarios negotiations defined the early phase of the Cyprus Emergency. They were also the first direct, high-level discussions between British leaders and the Greek-Cypriot community aimed at solving the *enosis* question. Their failure resulted in the deportation of the Archbishop with three other leading Greek-Cypriots and the escalation of violence to its peak levels.

Though there were numerous obstacles to peace, a last minute demonstration of brinkmanship by the Archbishop, and the inability of the two sides to deal effectively with the nature of Turkey's role in the island, prevented a settlement. The failure of the negotiations, in turn, resulted in an escalation of violence. Harding, temporarily freed from the strictures of public diplomacy pursued the physical destruction of the *enosis* forces. Colonel George Grivas, EOKA's military commander, unencumbered by Makarios's political maneuvering and hesitancy redoubled attacks on British forces.

A mutual obstacle during the negotiations was the fact that both Harding and Makarios were playing conflicting roles. Harding was both diplomat and military enforcer (Holland, 1998, p. 83). The field marshal personified unpopular coercive measures and the oppression of British rule. Harding found it equally challenging having to discuss a settlement with Makarios, the man he felt was responsible for the violence that claimed the lives of British soldiers and terrorized Cypriot civilians and law enforcement officials.

As much as the discussions centered on these protagonists, there were other parties involved. On the British side, the secretary of state for the colonies, Alan Lennox-Boyd — who came to Cyprus during the final phase of negotiations in an attempt to clinch a deal — played a pivotal role alongside the prime minister, Anthony Eden. Archbishop Makarios had frequent recourse to his councilors within the Ethnarchy. Some of these, especially Bishop Kyprianos of Kyrenia, were instrumental in contributing to a particularly uncompromising approach in the negotiations (Ethnarchy, 1956, p. 32; Averoff-Tossizza, 1986, pp. 56, 63, 95). Grivas remained in control of the military aspects of the struggle. While the colonel did not hector Makarios into obstinacy, he did encourage the belief that EOKA violence had real influence. Both Grivas and Makarios failed to realize that while violence might bring the British to the negotiating table, it would also limit the scope of concessions available to British policymakers, both because of domestic concerns and international pressure from Turkey. Turkish-Cypriots remained in constant communication with Harding, keeping the governor informed of their attitude towards any potential settlement and providing further limits on British concessions. This paper will explore the substance of the negotiations between Harding and Makarios.

The period between October 1955 and March 1956 was critical not only for the conduct of the British campaign in Cyprus, but for the broader issues which divided the island at that time. A number of those issues which proved stumbling blocks in 1955–1956, particularly the role of Turkey and the rights of the Turkish-Cypriot population, remain critical to understanding the divisions within Cyprus today. The paper will argue that the failure to come to a negotiated settlement during this time owed much to the incompatible aims of the two sides, but foundered on demands by Makarios for concessions beyond what had been agreed to with Harding and because of the inability of the Greek-Cypriot side to recognize the substantial limits Turkish concerns placed on British policy options.

Making a Start

As the new governor prepared to sit down and talk, Harding's instructions from Lennox-Boyd were to avoid declaring a state of emergency (Holland, 1998, p. 84). Instead, he was to focus on “moving on the road to self-government if possible”. On the day of Harding's arrival, Makarios asked the Ethnarchy Bureau for views on the upcoming negotiations. Several key points emerged: First, the bureau members emphasized that the British had to recognize the principle of self-determination for Cyprus. Second, a pre-determined time limit (not exceeding five years), pending the implementation of self-determination, would have to be agreed. Third, they had to clear up the “nonsense about the Cyprus question being a Greco-Turkish dispute” (Ethnarchy, 1955, p. 12). Turkey's direct involvement had been assured by the Tripartite Conference in London, and by the fact that Turkish-Cypriots remained concerned about their political and social future. Geography and history meant that Turkey would want a say in the future of the island. The British proposals put forward on the penultimate day of the conference (6th September) offered both a “new constitution” and the prospect of “self-government”, but these concessions would be circumscribed by “the proper safeguards and guarantees required by the international situation and the protection of the interests of the communities concerned”

(Tripartite Conference, 1955, p. 41).

These proposals would serve as the starting point for the negotiations between Makarios and Harding. No point of contention was more obvious than the role of Turkey and the position of Turkish-Cypriots. The Ethnarchy continued to ignore the reality that an insistence on self-determination — and through it the prospect of placing Turkish-Cypriots under Greek rule — would be unacceptable to the Turkish-Cypriot minority and the Turkish government. The disruption stemming from these objections would be unacceptable to the British as well. From the first meeting it was clear to the field marshal that Turkey's position in any settlement was the major stumbling block. Turkish interests affected both self-determination and a time-table for its implementation. Prime Minister Eden's emphasized the Turkish realities in a note to the new governor on 8th October. Makarios' "real purpose" he wrote: "is to manoeuvre us into excluding consultation with the Turkish Government. . . . I cannot judge whether the Archbishop's purpose is to divide us from our allies, particularly the Turks. If the latter, of course we cannot give way to him." Harding was also convinced that Makarios's primary aim was to reduce Turkey's influence on decisions in Cyprus and to settle the affair on a bilateral basis between Greek-Cypriots and the British government.

The Times echoed this conclusion writing that "[t]he Turkish view is that there can be no question of even the acknowledgement of the right of self-determination, and how this can possibly be reconciled with the Greek Cypriots' demand [of self-determination]" (1955a, p. 6). Whatever concessions the British were prepared to make, they could not commit "themselves to anything that might make *enosis* possible" (Mayes, 1981, p. 81). As Harding reported to the Prime Minister, Makarios was seeking a fundamental change in the British attitude towards Cyprus and there was "no hope" of this¹. Hubert Faustmann argues that this first round of negotiations failed because of "the British refusal to exclude a Turkish veto over Greek-Cypriot self-determination and to grant a Greek majority in parliament" (2001, p. 20). Turkey was the key factor preventing compromise, but it was not simply the refusal to grant Turkey a veto which scuttled a compromise. British policymakers had legitimate fears that Turkish opposition would become violent when confronted with any scenario which hinted at *enosis*. As British diplomats in Ankara cabled London, there was "practically no hope" of securing Turkish acquiescence to introducing a constitution in Cyprus². Britain was bound to Turkey under NATO and the Baghdad Pact. Makarios and the pro-*enosis* faction in Cyprus stubbornly refused to recognize this fundamental limitation of the British position.

On 16th November, Harding announced a new program of economic and social development to run concurrently with the constitutional overtures. The plan would involve £38 million in expenditures on rural development, irrigation, electricity, inland telecommunications, port development and education, all aimed at bringing new prosperity to the island (Times, 1955b, p. 10). Such an investment aimed at improving the standard of living for all Cypriots and securing "hearts and minds" for the administration. If the British government hoped that advertising a massive investment in Cyprus's future would help turn opinion in its favor, it was seriously mistaken. To Greek-Cypriots, the investment represented the unwelcomed message that Britain envisaged a long-term presence on the island.

Neither the negotiations nor the governor's investment pledge reduced EOKA activity. On 19th November 1955, 41 bombs exploded across the island. On the 24th, two British soldiers were killed in a gun-battle. While 74 acts of violence were recorded in October, there were 217 in November (Hansard, 1957, p. 104). The

¹ TNA, WO 32/16260, Telegram No. 792 from the Prime Minister to Governor Harding, 8th October 1955.

² TNA, WO 32/16260, Telegram No. 792 from the Prime Minister to Governor Harding, 8th October 1955.

rising tide prompted Harding, in spite of the cautions from the colonial office, to declare a state of emergency on 26 November. Emergency regulations were a common tool used by the British government during this period. They “gave the security forces plenty of latitude but with few of martial law’s drawbacks . . . the security forces operation within a clearly defined legal framework”, but one which “permitted them to employ a very high degree of often lethal force” (French, 2011, p. 103). In Cyprus, these emergency powers also translated to large-scale detention of individuals suspected of “terrorist” activities. In early December 1955, Harding and Makarios were once more at the negotiating table, but Harding was not optimistic about the prospects for a settlement. As he wrote to the secretary of state for the colonies on 2nd December, if discussions break down “I shall be forced to take really strong measures over a protracted period, no matter how unpleasant they may be, to keep the situation under control”³. Harding’s hardline position was as much a demonstration of his own convictions as an exhortation to Her Majesty’s Government to retain its firm stance with regard to Cyprus, or, in the event of concessions, to make them soon and openly. “I cannot conceive of anything more damaging for the future of this island”, Harding warned, “or for our worldwide strategic position than to make a stand now and later on to surrender to public opinion and coercion. Again with great respect I would urge that if concessions are to be made let them be made now, otherwise let us stand absolutely firm and see the business through.”⁴.

On both a professional and personal level, Harding’s patience was wearing thin. After their meeting on 21st November Harding had developed a degree of personal distaste for Makarios (Holland, 1998, p. 95). This antipathy extended to his attitude towards other leading figures in the Cypriot Church. By December, the field marshal was satisfied that the best way to end the violence was the destruction of EOKA, to be achieved, in part, by the removal of Makarios and Bishop Kyprianos of Kyrenia from the political arena. Such a move had already been discussed at the highest levels of the British government, even before Harding’s arrival. In September, the Cabinet had decided against authorizing the deportation of the Bishop of Kyrenia due to the possibility of a backlash in public opinion⁵. Harding would not be swayed. At the beginning of December, he once more laid out his views in favor of deportation to the colonial secretary if negotiations broke down⁶.

The Bishop of Kyrenia’s continued preaching of *enosis* rhetoric infuriated Harding. On 5th December, he wrote to Lennox-Boyd in exasperation, referencing a particularly incendiary speech and requesting immediate permission to “proceed with deportation”⁷. In spite of the provocations, the British government, wary of the risks, remained reluctant. W. H. Young of the Foreign Office minuted on Harding’s request:

However justified the Governor’s exasperation, the present seems a bad moment tactically to proceed to extremes. We have gone to great lengths to keep the negotiations with the Greek Government alive and the Secretary of State and the Colonial Secretary took great pains in the debate yesterday to leave the way open for the Archbishop and the Greeks. There can be little doubt that the expulsion of a leading Bishop, however justified, would put an end to any hope of a negotiated settlement.⁸

On 9th December, a revised formula for constitutional progress was given to the Greek government.

³ TNA, WO 32/16260, Telegram No. 817 from Governor Harding to the Prime Minister, 11th October 1955.

⁴ TNA, CO 926/277, Telegram No. 835 Steward to Foreign Office, 13th October 1956.

⁵ In Cyprus, there was a maximum of 2,109 detainees from a population of 369,854 Greek-Cypriots. This represented 570 detainees per 100,000 people, the third most in British counter-insurgency operations during this period after Kenya and Brunei.

⁶ IWM, Harding Papers, AFH 10, Telegram No. 1153 from Harding to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 2nd December, 1955.

⁷ IWM, Harding Papers, AFH 10, Telegram No. 1153 from Harding to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 2nd December, 1955.

⁸ TNA, FO 371/117661, Memo by RW Selby, 17th September, 1955.

British policymakers hoped that a formula devised by London and cleared by the Greek and Turkish governments would serve as a foundation for progress in the discussion with Makarios, providing direction and mutual reassurance. The relevant paragraphs read (points of subsequent contention with Makarios are in bold):

It is not therefore their [HMG's] position that the principle of self-determination can never be applicable to Cyprus. It is their position that it is not now a practical proposition both on account of the present strategic situation and on account of the consequences **on relations between NATO powers in the Eastern Mediterranean**. If the people of Cyprus will participate in the constitutional development, it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to work for **a final solution consistent with the treaty obligations [NATO and the Baghdad Pact] and strategic interests of Her Majesty's Government and its allies**, which will satisfy the wishes of the people of Cyprus. Her Majesty's Government will be prepared to discuss the future of the island with representatives of the people of Cyprus when self-government has proved itself a **workable proposition** and capable of safeguarding the interests of all sections of the community⁹.

British policymakers felt that careful wording, particularly the obtuse double negative, and soft generalities were required to prevent any of the involved parties from reacting negatively. Negative feeling in Turkey had been high for some time. As the ambassador in Ankara, Sir James Bowker, noted to the Foreign Office: "the Turks are nervous and suspicious that during the last three months Her Majesty's Government may have shifted their stand on the question of self-determination". According to Bowker, leading Turkish officials impressed upon him their concern that Britain's position on Cyprus might be modified by continued negotiations with Makarios. They had only "mistrust of any dealings with the Archbishop". To prevent a rift with Turkey, Bowker advised that British policymakers should be careful to "keep the Turks as regularly informed as possible about what is going on over the Cyprus issue and continue to give them all possible assurances calculated to tranquilize them about our position and policy"¹⁰.

British policy, by necessity, was a balancing act. In a telegram to the foreign secretary, Harding identified "five major factors to be considered" as part of the Cyprus question: "a) the position of the Archbishop, b) the attitude of the Greek Government, c) the feelings of the people of Cyprus including the Turkish community, d) The security situation and e) the attitude of the Turkish Government"¹¹. The difficulty in reconciling these five points was brought home by a letter from Foreign Secretary Macmillan to Lord Home, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations. "All the indications at present", wrote Macmillan, "are that this [a clause forbidding *enosis*] would be totally unacceptable both to the Greek Government and to the Greek Cypriots. Conversely, a treaty without such a stipulation would hardly be acceptable to the Turks."¹² These were the obstacles facing Makarios and Harding as two leaders prepared for their next round of discussions.

Harding and Makarios began their third, and final, phase of negotiations on 9th January 1956. The situation in Cyprus was precarious and the direction of events on the island hinged on their discussions. EOKA's violence during the winter had continued in spite of Harding's new emergency powers. Harding cabled Alan Lennox-Boyd in the early hours of 10th January, after his meeting with Makarios. "I had a meeting with the Archbishop this evening", he wrote "which lasted about two and a quarter hours. It was inconclusive but at

⁹ IWM, Harding Papers, AFH 10, Telegram No. 1165 from Harding to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 3rd December, 1955.

¹⁰ TNA, FO 371/117675, Telegram No. 1185 from Harding to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 5th December, 1955.

¹¹ Minute by WH Young (Foreign Office), 6th December, 1955, on Telegram No. 1185 from Harding to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 5th December, 1955.

¹² TNA, FO 371/123863, Cyprus – Revised Formula Given to Greek Government on December 9th, 1955.

any rate established that he is prepared to continue discussions on the basis of the revised formula"¹³. Makarios' apparent pedantry was an irritant to the more direct Harding¹⁴.

A one page memorandum outlining the British formula had been drafted and given to Makarios. The Archbishop raised three points of concern which Harding conveyed to Lennox-Boyd:

The third sentence and particularly the reference to "consequences on relations between NATO powers in the Eastern Mediterranean". (2) The statement that a final solution should be "consistent with the treaty obligations" of HMG and its allies. (3) The qualification that discussion of the future of the island would have to wait until self-government had proven itself "a workable proposition"¹⁵.

Although the British formula did not mention Turkey or Turkish interests directly, points one and two clearly referred to Cyprus's northern neighbour. To Harding, the reason behind Makarios's objections remained clear. As he wrote to Lennox-Boyd: "[Makarios] left me in no doubt that what is behind his objections on points (1) and (2) is the assumption that Turkey would exercise a deciding influence over the exercise of self-determination and the reaching of a final solution"¹⁶. Point three related directly to the ability of Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots to work together in governing the island.

Just two days into their discussions, a further complication regarding the place of Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot community in the crisis was added. On Grivas' explicit orders, EOKA initially did not conduct operations against Turkish-Cypriots. However, in early January 1956 Grivas changed his mind, believing that "it was impossible to avoid all actions against them" (1964, p. 73). As Grivas writes, "certain Turks in the police worked energetically against the Organization particularly in Paphos, and the area commander there, Yannis Droushiotis, decided one must be executed" (1964, p. 73). Droushiotis presented Grivas with the case against a particularly active Turkish-Cypriot police sergeant, Abdullah Ali Riza; Grivas authorized the sergeant's assassination. On the morning of 11th January, an EOKA gunman caught up with Riza as he was returning to his home in Paphos and shot him in the chest. He died on his way to the local hospital (Times, 1956, p. 8). Grivas' radical change in EOKA's policy at this critical time was an error. It reinforced claims regarding the insecurity of Turkish-Cypriots, further raised tensions between the two communities, and provided Turkey with opportunities to push its agenda more strongly with the British.

Word spread quickly throughout the island and by afternoon, Turkish-Cypriot shops in every town had closed in protest. Greek flags were pulled down and Greek-Cypriot shops were stoned, breaking their windows¹⁷. Telegrams and letters of protest from Turkish-Cypriot groups flooded into Governor Harding. In his telegram, Dr. Fazıl Küçük, the Chairman of the "Cyprus Is Turkish" party in Cyprus, bluntly laid out his feelings: "The Turkish community is enraged at the unprovoked attack on the Turkish police sergeant who was killed by Greek terrorists this morning... This act of violence . . . is bound to spread and with catastrophic repercussions for the whole Middle East."¹⁸ According to British reports, Turkish-Cypriot rioting on 11th January damaged 28 houses and shops belonging to Greek-Cypriots¹⁹. It was just the beginning of intercommunal conflict and the British administration would be hard-pressed to bring it under control. While the

¹³ TNA, FO 371/123863, Note from Ambassador James Bowker to J. G. Ward, 20th December 1955.

¹⁴ TNA, FO 371/123863, Telegram No. 5 from Harding to the Foreign Secretary, 2th January 1956.

¹⁵ TNA, FO 371/123863, Personal Letter from Macmillan to Lord Home, 4th January 1956.

¹⁶ TNA, FO 371/123864, Telegram No. 50 from Harding to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 10th January 1956.

¹⁷ TNA, FO 371/123864, Telegram No. 50 from Harding to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 10th January 1956.

¹⁸ TNA, FO 371/123864, Telegram No. 50 from Harding to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 10th January 1956.

¹⁹ TNA, FO 371/123864, Telegram No. 50 from Harding to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 10th January 1956.

Turkish-Cypriot factor gained force, the negotiations between Harding and Makarios were reaching a critical stage and Britain was in no mood for concessions that would upset Turkey.

Decisions

Two days after the riots, Makarios and Harding met for the sixth time. According to the minutes kept by the Ethnarchy secretary Nicos Kranidiotis, the meeting “was carried out in a polite manner compared to that of the previous meeting”²⁰. The increased courtesy did not narrow the divide. Makarios asked for the deletion of three phrases from the British formula of 9th December. First, he asked for the deletion of the caveat that self-determination could not be applied immediately in Cyprus because “it is not now a practical proposition both on account of the present strategic situation and on account of the consequences in relations between NATO powers in the Eastern Mediterranean”. Second, Makarios wanted Harding to remove the statement that the government would work towards a final solution of the Cyprus problem “consistent with the treaty obligations and strategic interests of Her Majesty’s Government and its allies”. And third, he wanted discussions on the future of the island to be reserved until (limited) self-government had proved itself “a workable proposition”²¹.

On the first point, Harding was willing to modify the phrase “on account of the consequences in relations between NATO powers”, to read “on account of the present strategic and political situation in the Eastern Mediterranean”. He hoped that the removal of the reference to NATO would reduce the latent presence of Turkey. Makarios was unsatisfied, however, arguing that the word “political” had to be deleted as redundant since “the obligations stemming from it are contained in ‘strategic’”²². Unable to achieve common ground, Makarios suggested moving on to the second point. The Archbishop felt that the reference to “treaty obligations” in relation to the nature of a final solution was unnecessary and asked that it be removed. Harding was unwilling to concede this point either because, in his view, the British government would be open to being accused of bad faith, both in Cyprus and by its allies, if it did not mention the significance of treaty obligations²³. Here again, Turkey’s presence loomed large. As Harding and Makarios debated the point concerning “treaty obligations”, the discussion melted into the third point of contention dealing with the political situation during a period of self-government and its effect on a final solution. The back-and-forth on this point provides an illuminating microcosm of the talks and is worth quoting at length:

Gov [Harding]: HMG recognize straight away that no treaty exists which excludes the application of the principle of self determination to Cyprus. In any case, I would not like to prolong the discussion. I would simply like to know whether you regard the retention of treaty obligations and of the condition of the political situation as a cause for the discontinuance of the talks.

H[is] B[eatitude] [Makarios]: I know the views of my people and of my counsellors and I am sure that this reference to the treaties will not make a good impression. On the contrary it will give grounds for England to be accused of bad faith.

²⁰ TNA, FO 371/123864, Telegram No. 65, Situation report from Cyprus to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 12th January, 1956.

²¹ CSA, SA1/1087/1956, Telegram 2747 from Cyprus to Turkish Party Chairman Küçük to Governor Harding, 11th January, 1956.

²² TNA, CO 926/416, Telegram No. 110 from MIDEAST Main to War Office, 14th January, 1956.

²³ TNA, FO 371/123865, Telegram No. 31 from Peake to Harding, Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of HB Archbishop Makarios and the Governor of Cyprus, Sir John Harding, on January 13th, 1956, 16th January 1956.

Gov On the contrary, Great Britain must put forward these conditions right from the beginning so that she may not be accused by her allies. If you really wish for an agreement, you must accept this point....

HB The application of obligations resulting from a treaty is obvious. Why should therefore special emphasis be attached to them in the particular case of the self-determination of the people of Cyprus?

Gov In order that Great Britain may persuade her allies and make her intentions clear to them... I fear that HMG will not accept the amendment and it would indeed be most regrettable if the formula were to be rejected for these reasons.

HB As I have already said I discussed the subject with my advisors and I say that this phrase is completely unacceptable....

Gov If we fail to find a solution this will be due to the unwillingness of Y[our] B[eatitude] to understand the obligations of Great Britain in this part of the world.

HB I am sorry to give such an impression...

Gov Would H[is] B[eatitude] [sic] accept the formula if these two points were omitted?

HB Yes. I would accept if there were to be omitted from the first sentence "the" and "political" and from the second "the existing treaty obligations". The same arguments apply to both these points.

Gov I am afraid this will cause misunderstanding between our allies to whom we must be clear. HB We and myself are also among those to whom Great Britain must be clear.

Gov Yes, but not only you²⁴.

To Harding's mounting frustration, the crux of the dispute remains Makarios's unwillingness to accept Turkish interests or Britain's need to account for Turkey's interests in a solution for Cyprus. Harding could not budge on this point because of the importance of the Turkish alliance to Britain's position in the Middle East and the Cold War. Makarios's final quoted sentence voiced the Greek-Cypriot desire to be the primary, if not the sole, consideration for the British policymakers. Harding's response was equally telling and demonstrated the gap between the two parties.

Significantly, there was no direct reference to Turkey. There is no evidence as to whether direct mention of Turkey was avoided intentionally to remove further divisiveness, or because Makarios did not wish to legitimize Turkish claims. Leaders in London realized both the extent of the Turkish factor and how assiduously Makarios was trying to avoid it. A personal note from the deputy under-secretary of state, J. G. Ward, at the Foreign Office encapsulated the situation:

[Makarios] now seems to have established pretty definitely that the Ethnarchy will not agree to a formula containing any reservations covering our "treaty obligations or any reference which implies that Greco-Turkish relations must be taken into account in considering the possibility and timing of self-determination". Our view in the Foreign Office is that we cannot possibly drop these reservations — quite apart from the inherent unwisdom of doing so, there is no doubt that the Turks will blow up. We therefore feel that a break in the negotiations for a settlement cannot be long avoided, despite the grim implications²⁵.

²⁴ TNA, FO 371/123865, Telegram No. 31 from Peake to Harding, Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of HB Archbishop Makarios and the Governor of Cyprus, Sir John Harding, on January 13th, 1956, 16th January 1956.

²⁵ TNA, FO 371/123865, Telegram No. 31 from Peake to Harding, Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of HB Archbishop Makarios and the Governor of Cyprus, Sir John Harding, on January 13th, 1956, 16th January 1956.

A Foreign Office minute codified Ward's informal letter and highlighted the difficulties posed by Turkey if the British government were to accept Makarios's modifications.

Both amendments proposed by the Archbishop are aimed at excluding any Turkish interest in Cyprus. Despite the fact that we have repeatedly told the Archbishop and the Greek Government that there is no question of a Turkish veto and the decisions about Cyprus rest solely with Her Majesty's Government, the Governor has concluded that the Archbishop will refuse the formula if political considerations affecting Turkey could be taken into account in coming to a solution.

As for the Turks, they "would resent our accepting either of the Archbishop's amendments. To them the amendments would seem to remove all the safeguards in the formula which we have assured them we would maintain. If we propose further amendments to these passages the Turks will be convinced that we are giving in to the Archbishop."²⁶

The Foreign Office argued that any formula along the lines Makarios requested, "would be unrealistic". Their quite correct conclusion was that since the problems in Cyprus were mainly political, "all relevant political considerations" needed to be taken into account. This included the "genuine and strong" interest of the Turkish government. The minute closed with a statement that mixed frustration and disbelief, positing that "there can be no possible gain to anyone, including the Archbishop, from neglecting a fundamental factor [Turkey] in the situation"²⁷. In January 1956, as during the plebiscite in January 1950, the United Nations overtures of 1954, and the decision to launch a campaign of violence in 1955, the *enosis* forces in Cyprus, spearheaded by the Orthodox Church, were ignoring Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot minority. Whether blinded by prejudice or by their commitment to *enosis*, they could not come to grips with Turkey's "genuine and strong" interest in Cyprus. Greek-Cypriot nationalists could not acknowledge the existence of a distinct Turkish-Cypriot community who remained directly opposed to *enosis*.

Makarios's intransigence caused great frustration in London and prompted attempts to shift him through Greek intervention. A Foreign Office telegram to Sir Roger Allen, the British Ambassador in Athens, made both points quite clearly. "If you have not already done so you should see the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs. . . . You should say that the Archbishop's reactions are most disappointing. His only answer to our attempt to meet his criticisms was to raise further difficulties and to be highly evasive about his attitudes toward terrorism."²⁸ Second, Allen was encouraged to "invite the Greek Government to consider urgently what they can now do, in their own interest, to make the Archbishop see reason"²⁹. British policymakers felt that a reasonable compromise was being offered along the lines laid out in the newly revised formula put to Makarios on 18th January. Slight adjustments of language attempted to address the Archbishop's critiques while maintaining good faith with Turkey. The operative paragraphs now read:

It is not therefore their position that the principle of self-determination can never be applicable to Cyprus. It is their position that it is not now a practical proposition on account of the present strategic and political situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. Her Majesty's Government have offered a wide measure of self-government now.

²⁶ TNA, FO 371/123865, Telegram No. 31 from Peake to Harding, Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of HB Archbishop Makarios and the Governor of Cyprus, Sir John Harding, on January 13th, 1956, 16th January 1956.

²⁷ TNA, FO 371/123865, Telegram No. 31 from Peake to Harding, Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of HB Archbishop Makarios and the Governor of Cyprus, Sir John Harding, on January 13th, 1956, 16th January 1956.

²⁸ TNA, FO 371/123865, Personal Letter from J. G. Ward to Sir Gladwyn Jebb (British Ambassador, Paris), 18th January, 1956.

²⁹ TNA, FO 371/123865, Foreign Office Minute, 18th January 1956.

If the people of Cyprus will participate in the constitutional development, it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to work for a final solution consistent with the existing treaty obligations and strategic interests of Her Majesty's Government and their allies which will satisfy the wishes of the people of Cyprus. Her Majesty's Government will be prepared to discuss the future of the island with representatives of the people of Cyprus when self-government has proved itself capable of safeguarding the interests of all sections of the community³⁰.

The changes accounted for two of Makarios's original three objections. Gone was the reference to NATO along with the words "a workable proposition". "Strategic and political" remained along with the mentions of "treaty obligations" and "allies". For Makarios, it was not enough. Oblivious to the concessions that had been made the Archbishop pressed his previous objections. Reference to "treaty obligations" and "allies" had to be removed along with the words "political situation" in reference to the Eastern Mediterranean. Harding did not budge. The two men met again on 27th January. Harding had just returned from a trip to London where he discussed the Archbishop's reservations with Britain's political leadership. He reported to Lennox-Boyd that the meeting had lasted two and half hours and that Makarios "was on the defensive throughout practically the whole discussion and clearly did not like it much."³¹ Harding's conclusion was that Makarios had found "himself in the difficult position of having to accept an agreement on our latest terms or of taking the blame for refusing a good offer"³². This time the disagreement centred on the nature of the constitution that would codify Cyprus's development towards self-government. Makarios argued that the formula under discussion "could not be considered separately from the constitution. For they might agree on the formula and yet disagree on important terms of the constitution which would stop cooperation". Harding countered that an agreement on the formula needed to precede discussion of a constitution and that the decisions on the framing of the constitution would have to be taken "not only with the Archbishop but also with all sections of the community". Makarios hoped for another meeting, but Harding's patience was running out. The field marshal replied that "he would only consent to meet the Archbishop again if the latter wished to have an elucidation of some point in the documents which he would be sending him on the following day"³³.

Makarios seems to have taken Harding's warming temper into consideration and called a meeting of the Ethnarchy Council on 30th January to discuss the governor's new proposals and wording. The Bishop of Kyrenia led the attack on compromise: "I consider the Governor's proposal unacceptable and we must turn it down. Had the Governor accepted a predetermined time limit of 3 to 5 years [before self-determination], we would accept. But if we accept this it would be tantamount to an affront. I insist on the historical slogan '*Enosis* and only *Enosis*'" (Ethnarchy, 1956, p. 28). Makarios admitted that the differences between his plan and the governor's plan were great. While the Bishop of Kyrenia regarded anything more than a 3-5 year time limit as a colonialist insult, Makarios held a more elaborate view. He disagreed with pressing for a predetermined time limit, even one as modest as 3-5 years, because they would not be able to predict the political situation in either Cyprus or Greece. Besides, by avoiding any particular time-frame, "we would be in a position to put forward our demand for self-determination immediately" (Ethnarchy, 1956, p. 28). Makarios was confident that the high morale among pro-*enosis* advocates in Cyprus would sustain his rigid stance. Another member of the council, the lawyer, Socrates Tornaritis, agreed that armed resistance had brought

³⁰ TNA, FO 371/123865, Foreign Office Minute, 18th January 1956.

³¹ TNA, FO 371/123864, Telegram No. 59 from Foreign Office to Ambassador Allen, Athens, 15th January 1956.

³² TNA, FO 371/123864, Telegram No. 59 from Foreign Office to Ambassador Allen, Athens, 15th January 1956.

³³ TNA, FO 371/123865, Revised Cyprus Formula, Foreign Office Minute, 18th January 1956.

results: "I also am a follower of the intransigent policy which has given results such as the right to self-determination in Cyprus. I am confident that the morale of the people will remain high" (Ethnarchy, 1956, p. 28). The new formula would not be accepted. This rejection was communicated to Harding by letter on 2nd February. "The text in question", Makarios wrote,

recognizes indirectly the principle of self-determination and states that its application, however, is made dependent on conditions so general and vague, subject to so many interpretations and presenting so many difficulties as to the objective ascertainment of their fulfilment, as to create reasonable doubt about the positive nature of the promise which is given regarding the final solution of the question in accordance with the wish of the people of Cyprus (Correspondence, 1956, p. 6).

Immediately following the meeting with Makarios, Harding took the British formula (newly re-worded in an attempt to address Makarios's concerns) to Cyprus's Turkish consul general. They met on 31st January. Their exchange confirmed the fears of the Foreign Office that Turkey's interest in Cyprus was diametrically opposed to the concessions sought by Makarios. The consul made two points. First, he emphasized to Harding that, in spite of their recent quiet, the Turkish people maintained very strong feelings on Cyprus. Second, he argued "that any system of self-government for Cyprus based on majority rule by the Greek-Cypriots could never be acceptable to the Turkish minority and would inevitably lead to civil war or something approaching it"³⁴.

While Harding tried to soothe the concerns of Turkish-Cypriots, the Foreign Office was encouraging Ambassador Bowker to work on reducing the hostility of the Turkish government in Ankara. "You must try to persuade the Turkish Government that we are not presenting them with a fait accompli on the constitution questions. As the rejoinder to the Archbishop makes very clear, the form of the eventual constitution can only be determined after full consultation and discussion with all sections of the population of Cyprus."³⁵

In light of these realities, Harding was reluctant to make specific promises on the constitution to Makarios. He was not a constitutional expert nor was he qualified to put forward the arguments for the Turkish-Cypriot side. As he wrote to Makarios on 14th February: "You will understand that Her Majesty's Government could not enter into commitments about the position of separate communities under the constitution before discussions have taken place at which representatives of those communities have expressed their views" (Correspondence, 1956, p. 8). Harding's letter continued: "It must be recognized that persistent violence and disorder have increased the difficulties of introducing constitutional government. Fear of intimidation has stifled free expression of opinion. The minorities are more concerned than before about the possible consequences for them of the advent of self-government" (Correspondence, 1956, p. 9).

To overcome the constitutional hurdles, British policymakers began discussions of tasking someone with legal qualifications to draft a new Cypriot constitution. This would provide for self-government (under British sovereignty), increased powers for the Greek-Cypriot community, and minority protections for Turkish-Cypriots. Proceeding with a new constitution was a major concession to the Greek-Cypriots. The British were willing to make significant efforts to win over the Turks to the constitutional exercise even though their own foreign ministry had warned that there was "practically no hope" of securing Turkish acquiescence to introducing a constitution in Cyprus³⁶.

³⁴ TNA, FO 371/123867, Telegram No. 191 from Cyprus (Harding) to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 28th January, 1956.

³⁵ TNA, FO 371/123867, Telegram No. 191 from Cyprus (Harding) to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 28th January, 1956.

³⁶ TNA, FO 371/123867, Telegram No. 192 from Cyprus (Harding) to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 28th January,

While the British government's move towards a new constitution was cautiously optimistic, the editorial board of *The Times of Cyprus* were positively hopeful. The cover of the edition for 15th February 1956 ran the headline: "All the Archbishop's main terms find acceptance. Governor Agrees: Peace is in Sight at Last." The story promised that "from the day when agreement on the broad outlines is announced — and that surely is very near — Cyprus can hope for an ending of the violence which it has endured too long and to move into a period of full self-rule" (Times of Cyprus, 1956b).

Getting the constitutional debate started, however, was proving extremely difficult because the formula had still not been agreed to. Makarios would not accept Harding's vagaries on the nature of the new constitution and was anxious to prevent concessions to Turkish interests, even though those concessions were vital to making the constitutional process work. Makarios and his advisors debated these issues again at a meeting of the Ethnarchy Council on 21st February. One representative insisted that the inclusion of Turks in the cabinet would have to "be avoided at all costs". Makarios was sympathetic to the principle. "Perhaps you are right", he said, "but in practice this would be unattainable". Even Bishop Kyprianos was cautious but cynical about appearing to be openly anti-Turkish. "We must not appear to be against the Turks, on the contrary, we must succeed in gaining their confidence so that we may attain *Enosis*." On the constitution, however, Kyprianos held nothing back: "I reject the constitution and insist on immediate self-determination" (Ethnarchy, 1956, p. 32). In this attitude, even among the pro-*enosis* Ethnarchy Council, he was alone. The other members, including Makarios, pressured him to reconsider his position, but Kyprianos remained adamant: "I have my opinion", he replied, "and you may proscribe me" (Ethnarchy, 1956, p. 33). Kyprianos, alone among the 26 councilors, refused to approve of Makarios's draft reply. *The Times of Cyprus* reported that the "portly firebrand", finding "himself in defiant isolation", stormed out of the meeting in Nicosia and drove back to Kyrenia alone (Times of Cyprus, 1956a). Makarios would not press for immediate self-determination, but his differences with the formula proposed by Harding meant that the two sides were still a long way off.

Makarios conveyed his concerns to Harding in a letter on 25th February. The Archbishop's cooperation "in the framing and operation of self-government" could be achieved if this phrase was openly acknowledged "as a transitional stage towards self-determination, which ever remains our sole and final aim". Moreover, such cooperation was only possible "in so far as the fundamental democratic principles . . . described in our previous letter were clearly established now as a basis of the constitution which is offered" (Correspondence, 1956, p. 11).

These democratic principles involved an assembly elected to reflect the demographic advantage of the Greek-Cypriot community, the control of that body over the cabinet of ministers (which would exclude Turkish-Cypriots from the cabinet), and guarantees that executive responsibility for public security would revert to (Greek) Cypriots once order was restored (Correspondence, 1956, p. 11). As a result of a consultation with Grivas on 28th January 1956 he demanded "the granting of an amnesty for all political offences" as "indispensable" to any agreement (Holland, 1998, pp. 109–110). Furthermore, Makarios insisted on an "early repeal" of the emergency laws. These terms, wrote the Archbishop constituted "every possible concession beyond which our national conscience and natural dignity do not permit us to go" (Correspondence, 1956, p. 12). In London, it seemed that Makarios was moving the goal posts, pushing for new and impossible concessions just as an agreement approached. As concluded in Cabinet: "[a]t this final stage, however, the

Archbishop had put the agreement in jeopardy by asking for an amnesty for all political offenders in Cyprus.”³⁷ Furthermore, by continuing to hammer the line that self-determination (meaning *enosis*) remained the “sole and final aim” of the Greek-Cypriot people, Makarios continued to ignore the reality that such a claim was impossible because of the Turkish factor.

It appears that Makarios’s further demands were a negotiating tactic designed to squeeze a few more concessions from the British. In early February, he again met with Grivas and explained to the colonel that “the people were getting tired” and that the high financial cost of the struggle meant that they should come to some solution. Makarios was concerned about EOKA’s military capabilities, but Grivas reassured him that they were a match for the British forces on the island. Grivas had his own concerns. The colonel wanted to know when Cypriots would be able “to exercise self-determination” and whether this period would “be defined by an international organization or an international committee”. At the end of their discussion, Makarios told Grivas that they “must accept this plan and give a written reply”. Nevertheless, the Archbishop still expected disagreements with Harding over the constitution. On 15th February, Grivas received a letter from Makarios telling him “to avoid any actions against the British because in all likelihood an agreement would be reached with Harding”³⁸.

The Archbishop’s new requests were a true display of Makarios’ characteristic brinksmanship. In 1959, he related to Governor Sir Hugh Foot how he had refused to grow a beard while a novice at Kykko Monastery. The Abbot had beaten him, but he refused. Finally, Makarios was threatened with expulsion from the holy order. Makarios packed his bags and a taxi was called. As Makarios put his foot on the step of the taxi the Abbot relented and asked him to stay (Foot, 1964, p. 184). In Foot’s view, Makarios was a man of “political skill... [with] confidence in his own opinion. But I sometimes think that he enjoys to gamble, to go right up to the edge, to pit his wits against everyone else” (1964, p. 185).

Harding developed a similar assessment of the man. Any agreement reached with Makarios would not “mark the end of the conflict but the beginning of another phase”³⁹. While the Abbot of Kykko backed down, Harding did not. The gambling style that cost Makarios little as a novice in the monastery carried a high cost for Cyprus in 1956. The British offer came off the table and the prospect for a peaceful resolution evaporated.

On 28th February, Lennox-Boyd arrived in Cyprus with hopes of clinching a deal. The next day he met with representatives of the Turkish-Cypriot community and with Makarios. Before their meeting, some ten explosions were reported in various parts of Nicosia. *The Times of Cyprus* accused the communists of planting the bombs in order to prevent an agreement (Times of Cyprus, 1956c), but the bombs did not prove decisive in scuttling a solution (Assos, 2009, p. 138). Lennox-Boyd informed Makarios that the British government would take a number of actions in return for the Archbishop’s condemnation of violence and his aid in restoring peace on Cyprus. These undertakings on the part of the British government would consist of an amnesty for all detainees “except those involving violence against the person or the illegal possession of arms, ammunition or explosives”, the repeal of the Emergency Regulations “at a pace commensurate with that of the reestablishment of law and order”, and the drafting of “a liberal and democratic constitution in consultation with representatives of all sections of opinion in the Island” (Hansard, 1956, pp. 1717–1718). Lennox-Boyd’s

³⁷ Although the governor and the archbishop would not meet in person for a month, they continued their negotiations through a series of letters.

³⁸ TNA, FO 371/123867, Telegram No. 235 from Cyrus (Harding) to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 31st January, 1956.

³⁹ TNA, FO/123869, Telegram No. 267 from Foreign Office to Ankara, 13th February 1956.

statement demonstrated the British government's willingness to compromise even on Makarios's new demands. The two sides were still unable to reach an agreement. Makarios was not prepared to accept Lennox-Boyd's statement "as a basis for cooperation", and "could not accept the exclusion of those carrying arms, ammunition and explosives from the amnesty or the reservation of public security to the Governor "for as long as he thought necessary". In addition, Makarios insisted that "the composition of the elected majority be defined to this satisfaction in advance of the recommendations of the Constitutional Commissioner" (Hansard, 1956, p. 1718).

London took Makarios's rejection as the final straw. Lennox-Boyd returned to England the next day and plans were put into motion to remove Makarios from the scene if he did not perform a *volte face* and agree to the offer. In Harding's opinion, after five months of talks, "[t]he time for decision had arrived"⁴⁰. The governor followed up Lennox-Boyd's arguments and "emphasized to the Archbishop the generosity of the offer of amnesty in its present form and urged that relatively unimportant doubts and uncertainties about its operation should not be allowed to obstruct an agreement". Harding argued that the issue of an elected majority in the future Cypriot assembly was "for the Constitutional Commissioner". But it was his interest "to see the constitutional talks started I earnestly asked the Archbishop, therefore, not to make an issue of this point such as to obstruct our getting the talks started and to disappoint our hopes of bringing the Emergency to an end"⁴¹.

The day after Lennox-Boyd's departure, Harding confronted Makarios with the reality of the situation; the Archbishop faced agreeing to the British proposals or a continuation of violence. Harding found Makarios' response "illuminating". In spite of the Archbishop's professed desire for a solution he did not feel that Harding's statement provided a "basis on which he would like to see an agreement concluded". Makarios blamed his predicament on the attitude of the people "a large section" of whom "did not wish to follow his lead in reaching an agreement. If he accepted, without having a wide measure of popular support, he would become an object of severe attack and criticism"⁴².

Makarios's prevarication was open to criticism on two counts. First, he portrayed himself as a prisoner of the will of the Cypriot people. This argument diminishes his agency as a leader capable of taking important decisions and shaping public opinion rather than simply relying on public opinion. One reason why Makarios was reluctant to appear too much in control of the *enosis* movement was his desire to distance himself from EOKA. It was important for Makarios to conceal his deep connections with the organisation⁴³.

The Archbishop had also been at the forefront of shaping and radicalizing that opinion which he now claimed prevented him from agreeing to Harding's terms. Makarios had preached the gospel of "*enosis* and only *enosis*" since 1950. He had organized the plebiscite of 1950 and, upon his elevation to the archepiscopal throne, had undertaken to canvass support for *enosis* across the globe. It was disingenuous for him now to claim that public opinion prevented him from agreeing to measures of compromise when he had been instrumental in shaping public opinion. Confronted with disagreements on major points and with Makarios still unwilling to condemn terrorism, the field marshal finally secured agreement from the government in London for his deportation. Bishop Kyprianos of Kyrenia would be deported as well.

⁴⁰ TNA, CO 926/277, Telegram No. 835 Steward to Foreign Office, 13th October 1956.

⁴¹ TNA, CAB 128/30, CM (56) 16th Conclusions, 22nd February 1956.

⁴² SIMAE, P 405/7/11, Description by Grivas of discussion with Makarios about Harding Negotiations, February 1956.

⁴³ TNA, FO 371/117678, Harding to Lennox-Boyd 15th December 1955.

On 9th March, Makarios was taken into custody as he attempted to board a plane to Athens from Nicosia Airport. Kyprianos was arrested at his home in Kyrenia. Polykarpos Ioannides, Kyprianos's diocesan secretary, was arrested on the street in Kyrenia and Stavros Papagathangelou, the priest of Phaneromeni Church and a leading recruiter for EOKA youth groups, was taken at his home in Nicosia. The four would be sent into exile in the Seychelles. The move was greeted by riots and violence in Cyprus, by attacks from the opposition in parliament, and by international condemnation. It was a calculated risk reflecting Harding's frustration at the failure to contain violence in Cyprus and at the failure of the talks.

These sentiments were apparent in a letter written on 4 March by Harding to his son. "[I]t was very disappointing that after such long and tedious negotiations we were unable to get an agreement", wrote the governor. "At the beginning of the meeting we had on Monday night — the Colonial Secretary and myself with the Archbishop — I thought it might take a different form from all my previous meetings with him, but it was soon apparent that he was determined to shield the terrorists and to [illegible] our bargaining. Looking back I cannot think of anything more we could have done to secure an agreement." The negotiations, "of the past five months", he confided, "have done a good deal to clarify the problem and to put it into perspective. Apart from that it was an essential political exercise to exhaust all possibilities of reaching a basis for cooperation by negotiation before resorting to other methods — rather like the amnesty proposition in Malaya — and it might have come off — it probably would have if it had been tried a year or two earlier." What remained clear to the field marshal was that: "By his persistent refusal to denounce violence the Archbishop forces us to the conclusion that he believes in violence as a political weapon and would not hesitate to use it again — a curious attitude for a so-called Christian leader."⁴⁴

With Makarios and Kyprianos removed from the picture, Harding hoped to enjoy greater freedom of action in the fight against EOKA and to undercut some of the organization's strength. Confined in exile, Makarios would not be able to rally support for *enosis* internationally, nor would he be in an effective position to denounce British policy in Cyprus and stir up the population against British rule. However, with Makarios removed, there was no prospect for a negotiated solution.

The decision to deport Makarios was a heavy one, heavy in responsibility, risk, and potential reward. Harding was now eager to make the most of the opportunity he saw to crush EOKA militarily without having to work simultaneously along the tortuous path of negotiation with the pedantic and uncompromising cleric. As he wrote to his son:

Up to date I have had to pursue two divergent policies — appeasement by negotiation and restoration of law and order — which has compelled me to refrain from some security measures while negotiations were still in progress. Now I can give the restoration of law and order, and the elimination of the terrorists overriding priority — so in that result my task will be simplified but it may involve doing some pretty unpleasant things, and the next phase may be a bit grim — we shall see⁴⁵.

A new phase in the struggle was about to begin: one which not only saw the escalation of violence between EOKA and the British, but also witnessed a campaign by the British government against Makarios *in absentia* and against the Cypriot Church. In many ways, the last of these was retaliation for years of violent abuse hurled down on the British from pulpits across Cyprus. Politically, the war against the church would prove every bit as grim as that against Grivas and his insurgents. Harding now had the chance to destroy EOKA,

⁴⁴ TNA, FO 371/123873, Telegram No. 470 from Cyprus (Harding) to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1st March, 1956.

⁴⁵ TNA, FO 371/123873, Telegram No. 470 from Cyprus (Harding) to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1st March, 1956.

but an escalation in violence also provided an opening for attacks by the British government's opponents against what they characterized as unacceptably draconian methods.

Conclusion

For Cyprus, the failure to achieve a negotiated settlement in 1956 was a costly, missed opportunity. The Greek-Cypriot side had had the most at stake. The responsibility of their leader, Makarios, was most acute for the failure, and the cost of that failure, would prove greatest for their side. Violence on the island would worsen, claiming hundreds of lives and hardening the division between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots. The key divides which proved unbridgeable for Makarios and Harding in 1956 remain the fault lines of Cyprus today: Turkish involvement, the division of power, and the political rights of the Greek majority. An approach which was at once naively optimistic and exploitatively maximalist on the part of Makarios exhausted the patience of Harding and triggered the collapse of the talks. The failure was costly to Makarios, but more damaging to Cyprus itself.

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