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Understanding Globalization. The Inter-Parliamentary Union From the Late Nineteenth to Early Twentieth Century

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The Inter-Parliamentary Union was formed in 1889, gathering, initially, 38 British and French parliamentarians. The IPU (guided, from 1901 up to 1908, by Frédréric Passy and William Randall Cremer), was to support and reinforce the objective of extending arbitration as a 'peaceful tool' for resolving the dispute between states. The aftermath of the First World War marked a decisive step forward in the development of a strong liberal internationalist milieux which promoted a peaceful order based on the international rule of law. This paper summarizes some issues of ongoing research and it focuses on two key topics: the rise of parliamentary control of foreign policy and the making of 'parliamentary diplomacy'. Besides, it tried to elucidate, from another point of view, the political building of 'transnational and peaceful politics' aimed at the growth of peaceful and 'progressive' social relations among States and how the 'peaceful politics' are subjects that engage the complexity and the deep-rooted issues of State facing to the 'first globalization' and the 'end of century crisis'.

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If the first phase of IPU was characterized by the debate about international legality and legitimacy (international justice, as a way of approaching the issue of sovereignty, for instance) and the reinforcement of arbitration within the international disputes, the second phase (after 1920) was characterized by the debate about the political action on international matters within 'Constitutional State' and between governments and parliaments, above all.

During the second half of XIX century, the international 'liberal pacifism' was divided between those who proposed the pragmatic way of international compulsory arbitration and of the *constitution du droit de neutre*(*come fruit d' unecivilisation international eavancée*)(IPU, 1901, p.11)and those (more politicized)who, instead, claimed for the abandoning of 'old ways of governing', and the introduction of reforms (it seemed to be evident, at the time, that just only the democratic republics could avoid war).

At the same time, a theoretical difference was created among scholars, and 'experts in international field: those who worked for the creation of a 'jurisdictional sphere' recognized by States, and, by contrast, other who thought that only the common progress of States (civilized) towards the International society could reach common values and then could shape 'arbitrarial forms' of resolution of conflicts, not imposed by the States.

Between 1851 and 1875, there was an acceleration in international arbitration's use, above all on certain specific questions, relating to conflict among states (Sohn, 1990). Then, arbitration, as 'legal tool', was reinforced again, starting from the 1870s, also taking form thanks to theoretical support on the subject of international arbitration provided by a number of transnational networks of 'experts' (*Institut de Droit*

International, for instance) in drafting treatries[1] (Raltson, 1929, pp. 227-303; Langhorne, 1996, p.43).

The 1880s and 1890s represented the phase of greatest expansion for peace societies and associations and it saw the construction of a transnational network, with an International Peace Bureau being established in Bern in 1892. This had the role of coordinating the various elements of the political pacifist movement. From 1889 to 1914 the Universal Peace Congress held 20 congresses and the Inter-Parliamentary Conference met 18 times in European and American towns (Cooper, a, 1991, p.60; Cooper, b, 1991; Laity, 201; Reid. 2004).

The Universal Peace Congress and the Inter-Parliamentary Union (initially called 'for peace and arbitration', headed by Frédréric Passy and William Randall Cremer, Trade-Union and Workmen's Peace Association leader)[2], were to support and reinforce the objective of extending arbitration as a peaceful tool for resolving disputes among states, by now a political objective of European 'public opinion', which increasingly directed its attention towards international matters (a reaction to the bloody conflict in the Austrian part of Italy, as well as the Franco-Prussian war, leading to a further series of conferences of experts and state delegates on international justice). Cremer had promoted a wide political campaign in favor of concluding a general treaty of arbitration between Great Britain and the United States, culminated in the drafting of a petition signed by 233MPsof the Commons.

The Inter-Parliamentary Union was formed in 1889, initially bringing together 38 British and French parliamentarians. In 1905 the union reached a total of 2000 members, including an American delegation. IPU immediately adopted legal approaches to the resolution of conflicts and advocated the greater use of arbitration and mediation, along with the limitation of weapons and disarmament.

Despite the frequent introduction of arbitration in the drafting of Treaties among States and many parliamentary speeches, which called for the establishment of international court of arbitration, the establishment of an international court was still opposed not only by the governments of European States. Moreover, parliamentary speeches, urging the establishment of an international court, were very rare.Certainly, the difference between an arbitral court and acourt, (that punished the States and their rulers), was substantial. Similarly, it was decisive the margin between a court composed of diplomats and experts in international law and composed of judges only.

In 1893, during the Universal Peace Congress in Chicago, when some former American and British delegates (especially jurists) at the Peace Congress in London - three years before - officially proposed a project for the creation of a permanent court, they once again encountered the opposition of the former continental delegates, worried about inevitable repercussion on the problem of the legitimacy of sanctions imposed by an international court, which, in their opinion, could damage the very foundations of sovereignty.

A concrete project for the establishment of an international court took shape with the setting up of a committee during the Universal Peace Congress in Antwerp in 1894, followed by the Inter-Parliamentary Conferences in the Hague and in Brussels in 1895. These proposals initially developed out of internal IPU debate, originating during the Rome Conference in 1891, although much of European public opinion did not fully support the initiative.

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[1] According to historians, the development of international arbitration can be divided into three phases: before the 'Alabama case' (1871), from 1871 up to the first Hague Conference (1899), from 1899 up to the establishment of the League of Nations. Between 1901 and 1914 more than 149 resolutions were passed.

[2] He was also the promoter of *LigeInternationale de la paix* (1867), of the *Sociétéd'arbitrage entre les nations* (1870) and the *Union internationale de la paix* (1890).

Subsequently, during the conference at the Hague, a brilliant delegate called Philip Stanhope[3] took up the proposal, which was to provide for an arbitration court consisting of a European Council of Great Powers[4](Zarjevski, 1989, p. 69). During the 1894 conference, two positions were outlined in the draft document establishing the international tribunal of arbitration.

The divisions among delegates (French and German speaking above all) - in addition to various points of view as regards the most appropriate 'legal devices' for arbitration and adjudication to be used to resolve international conflict through cooperation and diplomacy[5] - concerned whether or not to link a new kind of judicial institution to international law in fieri. Senator Arturo de Marcoartu (IPU member) (Marcoartu, 1878), Max Hirsch and Ludwig Von Bar (*Recueil*, 1931, p. 541; Marcoartu, 1878)[6] were among those against the proposal for an international tribunal.

In 1895, the Charles Auguste Benjamin Houzeau de Lehaie project, which took its name from the committee's coordinator, presented the IPU assembly with a draft outline for an international judicial institution, which could be defined as a Permanent International Tribunal of Arbitration (Šabič, 2008, p. 263; Descamps, 1898). This project struck a balance between recognising the right of states to resort to war in order to defend their sovereignty and accepting the application of international arbitration (*Official Report*, 1893).

The project, made up of 15 articles and approved at the Inter-Parliamentary Conference held in Brussels in 1895, provided for the creation of a 'Board of Arbitrators' chosen by States and a central office. The institution was based on the 'goodwill' of governments and States and could not impose sanctions. However, the proposal to formalise a permanent court of international arbitration was slowly taking shape and it was reiterated the following year at the American Conference on International Arbitration, held in Washington[7].

But, almost paradoxically, Russia, that would not be involved with their representatives at meetings of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, because it had not been considered as a 'parliamentary' State, organized the first multilateral conference.

The 1899 Hague Conference led to the creation of a Permanent Court of Arbitration as a means of maintaining international peace and security and was due, at least in part, to the active involvement of IPU parliamentarians. However although agreement was reached on the codification of rights for peaceful regulation, the first conference at the Hague did not approve special jurisdiction for the court, but rather a special arbitration procedure that states could apply if they considered this appropriate.

The first Conference approved the establishment of a Committee for examination of draft arbitral tribunal proposals[8], chaired by Edourad Descamps (at that time, perhaps, the politician most authoritative on these issues),which discussed the three proposals submitted by delegations. The British proposal was suddenly presented by Julian Pauncefote, then, in a few days, the Russian and the U.S. drafts (supported by Fredericks

[3] Philip James Stanhope, 1st Baron Weardale, was president of the sixth National Peace Conference in Leicester in 1910, led the British group in the IPU and he became president of IPU from 1912 to 1922.

[4] These ideas had already been expressed by Prime Minister Gladstone during a Commons' sitting.

[5] Arbitration is a method of resolving a dispute in which the disputants present their case to an impartial third party. Adjudication is a judicial procedure for resolving a dispute. It usually involves a traditional court-based litigation process.

[6] Left-liberal jurist and politicians, Schücking's mentor.

[7] Despite the suspension of the Onley-Pauncefote Treaty by the American Senate, the mid 1890s and above all the phase shortly before the holding of the First Peace Conference at The Hague marked a period of intense discussion regarding issues related to international arbitration, perhaps more than in previous decades.

[8] Some important lawyer were part of this committee, such as Tobias Asser, Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, Heinrich Lammasch, Frederic Von Martens, EdouardOdier and Philipp Zorn and then Leon Bourgeois (and some ambassadors), president of the Third Commission in the Hague.

Holls) followed[9].

These projects had a common political approach to the introduction of the arbitration, but achieved different forms of the International Court, at the same time all three projects proposed establishing a permanent International Bureau to organize a minimum of intervention in case of request for a arbitral resolution by a statein conflict[10].

The President Edouard Descamps quickly introduced a summary of the lively debate of the study commission. This report also took into account the attitude of Germany delegation opposed the compulsory use of arbitration(They thought that the compulsory arbitration was a restriction of the sovereignty and independence of the nation)(Hueck, 2004, pp. 266-67; Oppenheim, 1889, p. 28)[11].

This attitude was offset, in other respects, by the strong political support from the French delegation, which requested the introduction of the 'principle of freedom' within the action of the Permanent Court and the process of the selection of the judges (Mérignhac, 1900, pp. 318-319) .

The draft-which emerged from the summary given by the chairman of the committee- was very close to theBritish proposal and, perhaps, took into account IPU debate[12].

During the Hague Conference, a sort of international court took shape and was made a' list of judges-arbitrator'(recognized personality in international law and relevant on-professional judges-) appointed by the signatory Powers. The Court shall have jurisdiction 'special' and a bureau, residing in the Hague(Articles55-56).

In 1904, under the leadership of Richard Bartholdt, a member of the United States Congress, during the Saint Louis conference, IPU turned to the President of the United States, Theodore Roosevelt, seeking his support for its proposal to convene a new conference, which was to discuss ways of strengthening the existing arbitration court in the Hague (IPU, 1905, p. 74; Šabič, 2008, p. 263).

However, the Hague conference of 1907 – convened by Roosevelt – did not meet the Union's expectations. The participating states failed to strengthen international justice. The proposal to set up a permanent global court was not adopted because of disagreement among the States regarding the appointment of the judges.

But, the IPU debate was asserting the political opportunity to reinforce an «out of necessity» jurisdiction of international arbitration that went beyond the limits of «diplomatic justice», conformed, at the time, to the principle of legality, based on the 'diplomatic equilibrium' among States. Because of political approach, IPU members had advocated also the creation of a 'permanent congress of nations' (a parliament of the world) – which should have a working body 'vested with certain supervisory, directing and executive powers' – which

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[9] The american delegation was composed of three members: Fredericks Holls, Seth Low and Andrew D. White.

[10] The British project proposed establishing a list of 'arbitrators' - nominated by the governments (signatories by the Convention) - and the establishment of a Permanent Council of administration, composed of diplomats. The Russian proposal, however, advanced the idea of an international tribunal made up of a Permanent Bureau, composed of representatives of the five Great Powers of the Peace Conference (Russia, Great Britain United States, France and Germany), this Bureau would have informed (on the requests for arbitration) the European governments.The Great Powerswouldappoint ajudgefor each caseofrequest for arbitration .The U.S. proposal differed from previous ones, because the plan proposed the appointment of judges of the International Court through the appointment by the Supreme Courts of States Parties to the Conference.

[11] Thisgerman political attitude was not fully shared by members of the delegation such as Philipp Zorn, a staunch defender of the Permanent Court.

[12] Descamps'scommitteerecognizedas the 'founding acts'of the Permanent CourtofArbitration: arbitral tribunal of North, South, Center America States, signed April 18, 1890, Washington Treaty, March 8, 187, Article11 oftheGeneralConferenceofBerlinin 1885 aboutmediationand arbitrationfordisputesbetweenthe CongoandNiger, Articles55and 58of theGeneralConferenceinBrussels in1890on thesuppressionofslave trade, Article 23 oftheUniversal Postal Conventionof1891, Permanent Arbitration Treaty between Italy and Argentina in 1892, Arbitration Project between Great Britain and USA, notratified, in 1897.

was also not successful. It was partly achieved in 1920 with the League of Nations[13]. Moreover, in Hans J. Morgenthau's opinion, in international field there are two 'forces' that create the right: necessity and mutual consent (Morgenthau, 1952).

Finally, perhaps for the intervention of IPU within political and institutional environments, the role of the Court of Arbitration was defined in 1907, again at the Hague. According to the provisions of art. 41 of the Convention of 1907, 'the powers entering into the agreement', 45 states, undertook to maintain the court provided for by the previous convention.

While international arbitration appeared to have been reinforced by the First World War, international criminal justice had not yet been given substance, although some attempts, albeit unsuccessful, had been made by the Victorious Powers[14].

However, much of IPU saw the establishment of a permanent court of international justice as an aspect of international policy which could enhance and change the parliamentary system and diplomacy. With the establishment of the League of Nations in 1920, the League, also following pressure from IPU, nominated an Advisory Committee of Jurists[15] with the task of preparing a project for the setting up of a Permanent Court of International Justice.

The Chairman, EdouardDescamps, presented a proposal for the setting up of an international court on "criminal" justice *compétente pour juger les crimes contrel'ordre public international*. Although the work of the committee was characterised by theoretical and political discussion of the legitimacy of the decisions taken, the Permanent Court nevertheless saw the light. Itsstatute was approved on 24 July 1920[16]. At the Copenhagen Conference (1923), IPU President Laust Jevsen Moltesenstressed: *le parlementaires et les diplomates sont obligés à adopté l'idéal de la cause de la institution de la cour permanente de justice internationale pour entraîner les peuples*(IPU, 1924, p. 179).

Then, Hague Conferences and IPU have followed the words given by Leon Bourgeois's during his inaugural speech at the Advisory Committee of Jurists: There is between the sentence in a arbitration and the judgment of a tribunal an essential difference, a difference as profound as that which exists between equity and justice.(Procés-Verbaux, 1920, p. 8)

Broadly speaking, at the turn of the century European parliamentary life was marked by two 'political

[13] When the League was inaugurated with the Assembly as a multilateral deliberative forum (the idea of creating a parliamentary wing of the League had never been seriously considered by the states which drafted the League's Covenant), the Council as executive body, and the Court as an associated institution.

[14] It should be recalled that the Versailles peace treaty in 1919 provided for the charging of Emperor Wilhelm II by a special tribunal with regard to his responsibility for the events leading to the world war and for violation of war rights in the conduction of hostilities. It established that a request for extradition be presented by the allied forces to the government of the Netherlands, where the Kaiser had taken refuge, the formal request being made on 16 January 1920. The Dutch government responded by refusing to hand over the Kaiser to the Supreme Council of Allies, as the Versailles Treaty did not establish any obligations for the Netherlands, a neutral State extraneous to the treaty.

[15] The members of this committee, which was chaired by Baron Descamps, formerly President of the *Institut de droit international* in 1902 and authoritative IPU member, mainly came from a Civil Law background (7 out of 10, 2 from Common Law). MineichiroAdatci, Japan, Rafael Altamira, Spain, ClóvisBeviláqua, Brazil, Baron Descamps, Belgium, Francis Hagerum, Norway, Albert de Lapradelle, France, Bernard Loder, Netherlands, Lord Phillimore, British Empire, Arturo Ricci-Busatti, Italy and Elihu Root, United States.

[16] «The High Court shall be competent to try crimes against international public order and universal law of Nations, referred to it by a public full meeting of Assembly of the League of Nations, or by the Council of the said League». Art. 14 of the Statute of the League of Nations set up the court, although it was not included within the organs of the League (art. 2); thus the Statute of the court is not an integral part of the *Covenant* founding the League, although at the same time, the League of Nations was charged with nominating the judges of the court.

phenomena': firstly a clear division or confrontation in most parliaments between more conservative political circles, more strongly nationalist and isolationist, in favour of rearmament, and 'progressive' circles, more internationalist and open to colonial adventures and rearmament in terms of the military dimension. The second phenomenon regarded increased social mobilisation in defence of peace, involving political and parliamentary circles.

However, during the 1900 conference in Paris, the Hungarian delegate, Count Albert Apponyi, raised the problem of the legitimacy of European parliaments. In his opinion, the situation could be resolved by involving parliamentarians in IPU (IPUFIA, 1991, pp.47-49).In the words of the Hungarian delegate, Parliaments suffered from a disease linked to the indifference of society to national parliaments. This was probably one of the obstacles to effective government action in favour of peace. Effective action could be taken if parliaments resumed contact with the 'popular national will'.

Before the turmoil of the First World War, parliamentarianism had more solid roots in Great Britain, France and Italy than in other European countries - such as the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Spain - which had a 'constitutional' rather than parliamentary institutional system. Essentially, in addition to the countries already mentioned, only Belgium, Holland, Denmark and the Scandinavian peninsula had a parliamentary and electoral system (more or less widespread) - but not Sweden, where the power of the crown remained strong until 1914 - on the eve of the First World War.

Despite the national parliaments, elected by universal male suffrage, exercised effective control over policy decisions, legislative assemblies of the most important European countries were not asked to rule on the declaration of war of the government, if we exclude the Italian parliament.

During the First World War Parliamentary institutions were seeking aroleinac on text of'total war'(Kocka, 1984, pp. 126-154)that was designed to favor the executive at the expense of the legislature and encourage the military power to the detriment of the "civil power".

At the end of the war, some differences marked the evolution of the European Parliaments. If the 'Third' French Republic maintained its 'strong' parliamentarian system in the UK there was a clear regression of the legislature, while the Italian parliament was discredited by the war. Conversely in Germany the parliamentary system established (Bock, 2002).

Furthermore, government practice in relation to peace treaties was a secret process, as in the case of negotiation of the Versailles Treaty, for example, although after 1918 in Britain there was a decisive change in the role of parliament in foreign affairs. After the signing of the Versailles Treaty, Lloyd George returned to the House of Commons, which accepted the Treaty (with only four votes against) (Brownlie, 1980, p. 5;Parker Chase, 1931, pp. 861-880;). On the contrary, the Italian Prime Minister, Giovanni Giolitti, prevented Parliament from discussing the Turkish-Italian War—no less than seven times - (also known in Italy as the *guerra di Libia*) (Merlini, 1993, p. 33).

However, the First World War marked a decisive step forward in the development of a strong liberal internationalist social environment (peace movements, parliamentarians and international 'experts'), which promoted a peaceful order based on the international rule of law. At the same time, the First World War can be regarded as a breakdown of the old system of international relations based on the opposition of major power alliances and secret bilateral diplomacy. The new strand of Wilsonian internationalism replaced the Cobdenite internationalism of the pre-war period, which focused on free trade, international arbitration and neutrality as a three-way route to peace, with a new belief in efficient international organisation and collective security as a

means of maintaining and promoting peace (Long, 1991, pp.285-304).

During this period, through the birth of the League of Nations, the debate within IPU focused on the key issue of parliamentary scrutiny of foreign policy and so-called 'parliamentary diplomacy'[17](Ray, 1991). The 20th Conference (1922) in Vienna, after hearing HeirichMataja's report ('German' and Austrian delegates played a significant role on this matter) decided that a Permanent Commission on judicial questions should be entrusted with further study of this problem. During the 1924 conference in Bern and Geneva, the Assembly discussed the report of the Committee on Legal Affairs (chaired by Schücking[18]) (Kosskenniemi, 2001, pp. 196, 215-22) on parliamentary scrutiny of foreign policy, in which the Chairman of the Committee invited all the members to invite their governments to establish 'special' parliamentary committee on foreign issues (IPU, 1925, pp. 197-200). In his speech, Walther Schücking encouraged respect and reinforcement of 'political observance' of Article 18 of the League's Covenant (IPU, 1925, p.196[19]). This should lead states 'to seek their security in the development of legal protection within the League of Nations'; the article sought timidly to discourage secret diplomacy but did not sanction the prohibition of secret treaties. Moreover, the doctrine clarified that the registration and publication of treaties was intended only as a formality introduced by art. 18 of the Covenant and not as an intrinsic element of the treaty-making process. However, in IPU's opinion, the prohibition of secret treaties had to be enforced and become part of international law.

The Conference set up a commission chaired by La Fontaine, developing proposals for the parliamentary control of foreign policy, in accordance with the resolutions and statute of the League of Nations: *insertion dans les constitutionsde tous les Etats, en conformité avec le dispositions de l'art. 18 du pacte de la Société de Nations*[20]; observance of the parliamentary right to be aware of the details of international treaties; parliament as the scrutiny-body of government (Bruno, 1991; Chow, 1920)[21]; annual government report on international affairs; abolition of secret funds.

The resolutions of the Bern and Geneva conferences proposed that a special parliamentary committee should produce an annual report on the management of foreign affairs (IPU, 1925,Rapport de M. Le prof. Dr. Schücking, pp. 201-202). The second part of the resolution asked for the constitutions of states to introduce rules provided for by the League of Nations against aggressive war, unanimously considered to be an "international crime".

During the debates, there were different points of view; for example, Baron Frederick Pethick–Lawrence, a British delegate, pointed out that: parliamentary control of foreign affairs does not mean that a parliament should intervene during the negotiations, but when the negotiations are complete(IPU, 1925, p. 434) whereas the French delegates were for democratisation of foreign policy and 'open' or 'above board' diplomacy. By 1920, in the French parliament, 20 permanent committees had been set up. The committees of the French parliament became channels of information about foreign policy, rather than agencies producing it, although parliamentary control of foreign policy was mainly indirect, through financial control of the money spent on the

[17] In this context parliamentary diplomacy was mainly conceived as an inter-parliamentary activity.
[18] He was elected as the first German judge at the Permanent Court in The Hague.
[19] "Every treaty or international engagement entered into hereafter by any Member of the League shall be forthwith registered with the Secretariat and shall as soon as possible be published by it. No such treaty or international engagement shall be binding until so registered".
[20] The first article of Wilsonian Fourteen Points stated: 'There shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in public view'.
[21] In this context it is recalled that the Weimar Constitution provided for the establishment of a *Special Commission* on Foreign Affairs; it could investigate the State's organs.

diplomatic and armed services and through political disapproval after the event (Thomson, 206, p. 211)[22].

The IPU proposals were perhaps followed only by the Labour cabinet of James R. Mac Donald, who decided that Parliament would be given an adequate opportunity to discuss all treaties before their ratification. (In 1946 the control of policy and administration occupied on average about forty per cent of time in the House of Commons) (Viesman, 1966, p. 137).

To summarise, the advancement of parliamentary methods in international affairs was related to the de-legitimization of traditional handling of foreign affairs, however in the IPU debate parliament had the role of exerting influence rather than determining foreign policy.

Overall, in this interesting discussion of parliamentary control, IPU was also tempted to suggest 'parliamentary diplomacy' (Bailey, 1962, pp. 308-314; Dickmann, 2005; Baiocchi, 2005;Beisner, 1986; Berridge, 2002; Hamilton, Langhorne, 1995, pp. 140-144) as a method of multilateral negotiation. This responded to the political need to strengthen international arbitration and mediation procedures and was encouraged by a strain of liberal thought which emphasised the importance of popular consent in sustaining governmental authority. Primarily it was carried out by professional diplomats and now became a nexus between parliamentarians and parliamentary procedures (i.e. between parliamentary methods and the appearance of parliamentary agents in diplomacy) in international relations for enhancing the ideas of peace and 'democracy'. In 1924 IPU's French delegate, Joseph Barthèlemyemphasised : *La democratie est actuellment la grande resource d'ordre, c'est le grand élement de stabilité et, dans l'organisation internationale de monde, la democratie avec son inévitable corollaire: la publicité, c'est la plus grande garantie de la paix*. In the League there was to be constant tension between parliamentary diplomacy, traditional diplomatic methods and the agents involved (Götz, 2005, p. 275; de Puig, 2008; James, 1980).

During the 1925 IPU Conference (at Washington and Ottawa) a Romanian delegate, Vespasien V. Pella, taking a look back at the topics of debate so far discussed by IPU, effectivelysummarised : *La securité générale, la réduction des armements, le contrôle parlementaire de la politique extérieure, l'interdiction d'accorder des emprunts internationaux de guerre, enfin, tous ces moyens de prévention de la criminalité collective des Etats, ne son en réalité que les conséquences pratiques de l'administration de l'idée supérieure de justice dans la vie internationale*.(IPU, 1929, pp. 279-371)

However there were also other pressing issues for IPU. The Berlin conference of 1928 drew on IPU policies for strengthening the parliamentary system, in an interesting debate (IPU, 1924). The six points of the resolution submitted by the former German Chancellor Wirth, on behalf of the permanent committee for the study of policy issues and organisation, were: the need to ensure the stability of government and reinforce the parliamentary system, defending the independence of parliament and government in the face of interference from large economic organisations, the need for parliaments to ensure the support of experts in committees and advisory bodies, the introduction and strengthening of institutional 'tools' such as the referendum, improving techniques and parliamentary procedures in order to promote well thought-out decisions and improve the preparation of the act texts (setting up of permanent committees corresponding with the ministries).

However, the political demands of IPU were changing. The interesting debates on the underlying concept of peace were giving way to impending problems such as the survival of 'democratic' systems, the management of migration flows and the rights and duties of states in social policies.

[22] During the inter-war years, there was broad and substantial agreement in France as regards foreign policy.

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