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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License
Article
Research on Anti-monopoly Law Regulation of Platform Self-Preference
Author(s)
DONG Qichao
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DOI:10.17265/1548-6605/2023.03.004
Affiliation(s)
University of International Business and Economics, Beijing, China
ABSTRACT
The typical manifestation of the platform self-preference is to change the original behavior, give preferential treatment to the products or services of its own downstream market or the second market, and exclude the equally efficient competitors in the downstream market. Self-preference by dominant platform enterprises will have both positive and negative effects, which is a vague behavior suspected of monopoly. Therefore, the illegal judgment of this behavior has become the core issue of anti-monopoly law regulation, and there are disputes in the academic circle on this issue. There are other more restrictive damage theories between the two extreme viewpoints of requiring dominant platform enterprises to bear equal treatment of general obligations and pure effect analysis. However, these damage theories may not only have the risk of misjudgment but also the risk of missing judgment, so we should start from the Angle of leverage theory. Self-preferential treatment is actually a kind of leverage behavior; platform companies have no legitimate reason to change the original behavior, abuse the dominant position in the first market, and exclude equally efficient competitors in the second market. Therefore, by comparing the types of leverage behaviors such as tying, price squeezing and refusing to deal, it can be concluded that free preferential treatment constitutes an abuse of market dominance.
KEYWORDS
self-preference, leverage theory, leveraged behavior
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