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Critiques of “Moral Status”: The Case of People With Disability
A S M Anwarullah Bhuiyan
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DOI:10.17265/2159-5313/2020.06.007
Jahangirnagar University, Savar, Dhaka-1342, Bangladesh
This article provides justification of the concept of whether a human being with a disability is viewed as a person. In this regard, personhood is a serious candidate in the discourse of moral and political philosophy to determine if a person has moral status. It is essential to consider some philosophical debates regarding the moral status of people with disability. Current article will concern with this question: why are people with disability not treated as a normal person? This question may be coined alongside another one: are capacity and personhood the only conditions to have moral status? If this is so, how is a person with disability defined? Would we treat them as “normal human beings”? This article focuses its discussion on these questions.
consciousness, disability, humanhood, moral status, personhood, reason, virtuous capacity
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