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Article
Author(s)
Hidenori Ikeshita1 and Atsushi Fukuda2
Full-Text PDF XML 1137 Views
DOI:10.17265/2328-2142/2018.03.002
Affiliation(s)
1. Road Policy Group, Japan Institute of Country-ology and Engineering, Tokyo 1050001, Japan
2. Department of Transportation Systems Engineering, College of Science and Technology, Nihon University, Chiba 2748501, Japan
ABSTRACT
This study discusses the optimal link toll, which
maximizes social surplus under a user equilibrium condition, with imperfect
substitution assumption for route choice in a transportation network with many
nodes and links, as well as taking into account the welfare cost of funds
procurement. In contrast to previous studies, this study formulates optimal
link tolls, taking into account the marginal cost of public funds (MCF), which
is the marginal welfare loss of taxpayers due to a marginal tax raise. The
formula for optimal tolls on links is derived from the following conditions.
One is MCF classified into two, not taking into account funding (MCF equal to
-1) and pricing for funding (MCF does not equal -1).
Another is tolls classified into two, pricing on all links (full link pricing),
and pricing on a specific link (partial link pricing). Following the above
conditions, this study succeeds in deriving the formula for optimal tolls on a
full network with many links and nodes. Furthermore, this study indicates two
calculation methods: one is to solve analytically or numerically for when the
functional form of link flow demand is known. When the functional form is
unknown, such as a perfect substitution case, it is necessary to carry out
iteration until convergence: with the traffic assignment given the price level
and with a change in price level based on the traffic assignment.
KEYWORDS
Optimal tolls, congestion, MCF, procurement of funds.
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