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The Rise and Fall of Soviet-Egypt Special Relations, 1971-1974



Author(s)

SUN Degang, BAI Xinyi

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DOI:10.17265/2328-2134/2018.02.001

This article is set to investigate the special relations between the Soviet Union and Egypt in early Sadat administration, 1971-1974. The Soviet-Egypt special relations were based on three factors—international system, states, and decision-makers. From the perspective of international system, since U.S. and Israel were the status quo powers, and the Soviet Union and Egypt were the revisionist countries that aimed to challenge such an unfavorable power structure, Moscow and Cairo were forced to form a coalition; from the national level, the pursuit of common security instead of economic interests became the important factor of promoting Soviet-Egypt special relations; from the decision-making level, the Soviet leaders viewed Egypt as the bridgehead to expand her interests in the Middle East. Likewise, Sadat acknowledged that the Soviet Union was the main source of obtaining advanced weapons on the one hand, but meanwhile was concerned that the Soviet Union could manipulate Egyptian leadership and may interfere in the internal affairs of Sadat administration. In fact, the two governments’ elites established asymmetrical special relations based on expediency and convenience, and hence such special relations were doom to fall apart with the shuttle diplomacy of Henry Kissinger, the US Secretary of State in late 1973.

Soviet-Egypt relations, quasi-alliance, special relations, Middle East Cold War