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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License
Article
THE CONFLICT AGAINST CORRUPTION AND THE PURSUIT OF EFFICIENCY IN PUBLIC NEGOTIATION IN ITALY
Author(s)
Gianfrancesco Fidone
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DOI:10.17265/1548-6605/2017.01.003
Affiliation(s)
ABSTRACT
This work aims to
investigate the relationship between the two diseases of public negotiation
that is the inefficiency and corruption. For twenty years Italian Legislator
trend, has been to fight corruption through the deprivation in the hands of
public officials of the needed discretion to take efficient choices, through
the tightening of purchasing procedures and contractual models. The path followed by the Legislator in fighting
corruption can be criticized because it
has a priori renounced to the efficiency, especially in the case of complex contracts, with the consequence of
bad contract terms, overspending, poor quality, useless contracts, improper
engineering, etc.
By inverting the traditional approach, it is
reasonable to argue that measures to combat and reduce the inefficiency can
also have the indirect effect of reducing corruption. In fact, if corruption
corresponds to a portion of the inefficiency and hides behind it, improving
efficiency (i.e. the reduction of costs, the shortening of the times,
quality improvement and ultimately the achievement of the performance) can
reduce implementation space of corruptive pacts.
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