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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License
Ambiguity in Leadership Communication: A Latent Hazard in the Aviation Community?
James Bryan Burrows-McElwain, Ibibia Karisemie Dabipi, Dollie McCormick
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DOI:10.17265/2332-8258/2016.01.001
In aviation, it is common to have several aircraft operating in similar conditions uneventfully, yet another aircraft, following suit, experiences an accident in the same conditions. With the same information available to crews of both aircraft, conditions can quickly change leading to an accident for one, while the other crews land safely. Should this situational ambiguity be the cause of the accident/incident instead of the crew’s poor judgment in light of the fact that others made the same decision without error? Can industry policies communicated to the crew on how to behave in these ambiguous situations be at fault? Do current practices tolerate this type of ambiguity? This paper explores the concept of ambiguity in leadership communication in the context of the airline industry. The authors define the variable of ambiguity in the context of National Airspace System operations and explore its impact on safety. Ambiguity is viewed as a latent hazard in the cockpit, the air traffic control environment, and operations components of the aviation industry. The concept of ambiguity is defined and explored using aviation case study to highlight its influence on aviation safety and decision making using the Reason Accident Causation Model. Additionally, this paper explores various survey instruments and scales that might be considered for observing and measuring these phenomena in the aviation community and recommends best practices.
Ambiguity, leadership, aviation community, communication
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