

# Russian Effort to Return the Global Role and Adjust the International Balance in the 21st Century

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Russian philosopher Ivan Eileen thinks Russia's role in the world as a superpower. The great power is not limited to the size of the territory or the population, but through the ability of the people and their government to shoulder the burden of major international tasks and to deal with these tasks creatively. Since 2000, Russia has sought to restore the role of the global force in resolving international crisis, management, and decision-making. It has also used its power as a superpower to defend its vital interests in the world with skillful diplomacy at the political and economic levels. By the use of military force, the Russian president Vladimir Putin has a central role in the Russian vision of the world role and the restoration of international balance in favor of the Russian federation.

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The concept of the global political role develops through the behavior of the state concerned and its political positions towards the issues and the hierarchy of the international system, which is an influential part in its formation. The more it affects the values of the regime and the order of its hierarchy, the more it indicates the global active role of that state. As for the international balance, Ismail Sabri said, "It is a tool through which states can organize conflicts of power between them so as to ensure the continuation of the existing international order, protect its independence and prevent the ingestion of its national entity by superior international forces".

The dynamics of the Russian-United States (U.S.) relationship over the past two decades have seemed unstable and unpredictable, to some extent, by other parties in the regional and international arenas.

It is difficult to find a country other than the U.S., whose relationship with Russia has been very sharp in so short a time. The periods of effective political dialogue between both governments (U.S. and Russian) have been interrupted by sudden interruptions that led to Moscow and Washington accusing each other of failing to meet treaty obligations or keeping commitments.

Moscow is dealing with Washington and their regional and international interests, particularly their differing interests in the Middle East and North Africa, on a case-by-case basis, and then changing its behavior with Washington accordingly.

Both governments (U.S. and Russian) are coming to an alliance on their sensitive issues in the Middle East, but as a result of mutual interests in various issues of equal importance and priority to Moscow. In this sense, it

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cannot be said that the development of Russian-U.S. relations is absolutely unpredictable. It is subject to certain rules.

Despite Moscow's lack of a unified plan of action or a clear perception of top priorities toward Washington, it has clear national interests in Syria, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Israel, and its foreign policy is based on those interests. It is unlikely that the U.S. stand in front of Russia to change its attitude based on those interests to the success of this policy.

In contrast, there are several important worries of Russia's foreign policy toward the U.S., which cannot be ignored, most notably national security issues. One of the important worry of Moscow's foreign policy is that it does not accept any active military presence of the U.S./North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) near the Russian border or in areas and it considers being within the sphere of Russian political interests and aspirations.

Because of Russia's inability to keep up with the military political challenges of the U.S./NATO, Moscow is instead resorting to asymmetrical retaliatory measures. These measures include the temporary intensification of cooperation with opponents of Washington and Europe. As a result, one can always trace the link between periods of improved Russian-Iranian relations and periods of faltering Moscow's dialogue with the West.

In these circumstances, Russia is using Iran, Syria, and Turkey as pressure cards in its political dialogue with the U.S. and Israel, where the Russian authorities played these cards during periods of rapprochement and tension with the U.S. and Israel, especially the Syrian and Iranian papers, and specifically the Iranian paper either by freezing or strengthening cooperation with Iran other times.

And that the geopolitical change witnessed by the Russian state at the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century had born the "emotional vacuum" of the Russian people associated with belonging to the superpower, and the Russian leadership's perception of the seriousness of the American-Western blockade of the territory of Russia and deprive it of its former vital area, and the deployment of U.S. military bases on the outer wall of the territory of Russia. The Russian foreign strategy was designed to adopt the approach of the "national state" whose mission is to preserve the historical existence of the Russian nation in the form of greatness and to affirm the leading role in the hierarchy of the international order.

The hypothesis of our research stems from two basic bases:

(1) The Russian approach after the year 2000 in the management of foreign relations fulfills the demand to restore the global role of Russia and adjust the international balance;

(2) Russia's strength and geopolitical position in its regional and international relations is based on its firm belief that the fundamental principle of peace and justice is not limited to diplomatic action but also depends on the element of war and conflict through the management of strategic conflict through its associated actors. The new task is to work with all the regional powers in favor of the growing Russian power in the Middle East, to be able to extend its influence, to present itself multiple faces, and to deal with many countries and centers of regional prominent powers in the region, notably Turkey, Israel, and Iran.

The analytical approach and the content analysis methodology were adopted. The importance of the study comes from the new turn in the global role of the state of the Russian federation in the formation of international alliances and economic blocs and the management of international crisis to achieve the prestige and the role of global leadership of Russia again.

The first section is a reading of the geopolitical variables that changed the map of the nation and the Russian material strength. In the second section, the incentives to build strength and return to play the dominant

role and participate in global decision-making are shown by the influence of Russian elites and leadership. The third section will follow the geopolitical approach adopted by the Russian leadership in its effort to return the global role and adjust the international balance through a series of new blocs and alliances with regional forces across the world.

### **Geopolitical Changes of the State of Russia**

The basic geopolitical principle of “the relation of the state to the place” had undergone a major change and cracking of the great Russian state with a global message, either by its Tsarist or Soviet heritage, and by the widespread loss of its power and influence over the regional and popular size and economic resources enjoyed by Russian power. In 1991, Russia was fragmented to 15 independent states. The Russia’s Moscow used to influence a territory of 22,276,060 km<sup>2</sup>; shrank to 17,075,400 km<sup>2</sup> in 2000, and its population shrank from 293,047,571 million to 143 million. These geopolitical changes have deprived central Moscow of its domination and leadership of the Eastern European Continent (the former communist states and members of the Warsaw Pact), which was considered the advanced location of the defense line and the expansion of Russian power. These lands were defined by Western geopolitical scientists as the heart of the world and the key to world domination. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, parts of it turned into a pro-Western military front and a U.S. force on the outer wall of Russia when Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania joined the NATO, and Russia’s gas pipelines to Western European countries extending under the Baltic Sea. On the Caspian side, Russia used to control most of the geopolitics of the sea and its sovereignty was also divided.

The sea became under the control of five countries: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and Russia. Before 1991, it was a Russian and Iranian lake overlooking Russia on the Great Ocean, which meant that Russia lost large shares of sea production. Of the oil, where Caspian oil reserves are estimated at up to 4% of the world’s reserves, with natural gas reserves up to 7% of the world’s reserves, according to the International Energy Agency. The most serious geopolitical variable is the concentration of U.S. military bases in the Tajik, Turkmen, Uzbek, and Georgian territories, all of which surround the new Russian entity, with the existence of old military bases close to Russia as well as in Turkey, Cyprus, South Korea, the Philippines, Afghanistan, and Norway.

The American power has long regarded Russia as the historical impediment to the spread of American hegemony across the European world and the whole world. The Russian history shows that any Russian military approach to Moscow reinforces Russian power and power not only to defeat the military invasion but to achieve a global expansion and expansion of Russian power. The attempt to invade Moscow by Napoleon Bonaparte in 1812 followed not only the defeat of the invading army, European territories and annexes of Ukraine, Belarus, and the Caucasus. When the German Nazi armies tried to invade Moscow in 1941, Russian forces were pushed to expel the invaders and expand again at the expense of the European territories, including the Kalyina region of Finland, Malavia and Persavia of Romania, and the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

The events of 2014, in which the U.S. called for the entry of Ukraine into NATO and because Ukraine is only 180 km away from Moscow, the Russian military force to occupy the Crimea in order to stop the U.S. West Crawling aimed to narrow its vital area and threaten its security and entity, and to confirm their ability to rebalance for its benefit in the region.

### **The Driving Force for the Restoration of the Role and Global Leadership of Russia**

States begin to build their strength in terms of international relations by employing the elements of power available to them. These elements include population structure, political culture, the type of political leadership, as well as the state's strategic economic resources. On the subject of the population, the Russian people still bear the characteristics of the faithful of Russia's historical message and the importance of Russian power to lead the world. Some Russian intellectuals believe that the reconstruction of the Russian Empire is the only formula for the proper and natural existence of the Russian people and as the only possibility of reaching its historical and cultural mission.

The emotional vacuum left by the historical event "the collapse and disintegration of the Soviet Union" calls for new values and ideals to replace the feelings of greatness that the Russian person has been singing throughout history. But the rise of Russian President Vladimir Putin, who works and emphasizes the need to view Russia as a successor to Soviet power and dissatisfaction with regional roles of Russian heritage since the establishment of the Eurasian Power Center in Moscow as a symbol of that historical power. The Russian State Duma, a total of 238 members of the State Duma, 156 deputies, organize and believe in the united Prussia and Communist's thought.

The united Russia, President Putin's party has 92 seats and the Communist Party holds 64 seats. Russian president Vladimir Putin has been elected as president since 2000 and President Putin has the characteristics of "attraction and payment" that attract the nation toward him and drive them toward the highest goals of the nation under the influence of the leader. Henry Kissinger presents an analytical reading of Putin's personality,

He is a figure who came from the world of the secret police, and progress in the shade suggests a strong nationalism and a cold analytical tone, leading to a foreign policy that can be compared to the policy pursued by the tsars seeking to dominate the neighboring countries.

Former secretary of State Hillary Clinton also confirmed Putin's description:

Putin's view of the world is shaped by his admiration of the powerful Kaisers of Russian history, Russia's long-term interest in controlling the countries on its borders, and his personal determination that his country should never be shown again. Weak is at the mercy of the West.

The foregoing shows the U.S. politicians' opinions on Putin's approach to force-making and the attempt to regain Russia's leading and dominant role in its geostrategic environment.

Putin confirmed this perception in an article in a Russian newspaper by saying that his intention to regain the lost power in the former republics and create a strong super-nationalism, able to become a pole in the modern world.

From the historical experiences of the nations, political leadership has a crucial role to play in confirming and following up on the nation's mission and making successful and effective foreign policy decisions. In particular, as the German geopolitical analyst (Carl Schmidt) points out, "Achieving the lebensraum theory is linked to political will alone, which recognize the historical necessity of such a geopolitical move".

Putin's global ambitions support Russia's acquisition of the necessary strategic goods and services for the various countries of the world. Oil, natural gas, arms trade, technology, fellowships, space research, and the power of Russia's voice in the United Nations (UN) Security Council are all sources of strength under which

Russia relies and sometimes controls the type of relationship and Russian power over political decisions and its relationship with the CIS (Association States Independent) countries from the former Soviet Union.

### **Russian Efforts to Restore Balance and Control the Global Role**

The task of geopolitics is to use the facts of the place and its strengths to support the political decision. Russian decision-makers have realized that their geopolitical loss in their western front and the end of their vital area in Eastern Europe can be compensated by Asian.

In addition to the power outlets around the world, and the dual movement on the level of regional and global powers and in all areas of economic, technological, and military power, and the coordination of international stances, especially in the Security Council. Russian leaders also used the “carrot” without the stick. The Russians used their energy, oil, natural gas, arms trade, space technology, and nuclear energy to manage new axes and economic blocs that create a world front separate from and rival to the American-Western world.

Russian thinkers believe that the world’s transformation from unilateralism to bipolarize is done only by the Russian-Chinese alliance, so Russia has moved toward China to create an Asian political bloc that is central to the rest of the Asian powers of common interest, which at the same time rejects American-Western domination.

Russia and China have veto power in the security council, the coordination of political positions at the international level in support of the weight of the Russian voice, as a result of these trends created the “Shanghai Cooperation Organization” in 2001, which collected all Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan (Central Asian countries) and four observers—India, Iran, Mongolia, and Pakistan, as well as dialogue partners Sri Lanka and Belarus. The bilateral agreement between China and Russia has increased to bring the Brix in 2009 and this time to form a qualitative bloc of civilizations. The membership includes Russia, China, and India from the continent of Asia and South Africa from the African continent and Brazil from the South America continent.

To translate this step as a global trend to reduce and stop U.S. hegemony, and the globalization of the world, Brix Group created the New Development Bank in 2014 with a capital of \$100 billion to provide soft loans in competition with U.S. hegemony over World Bank policies. The Brix Group has been characterized by a world of aspirations for global roles and regional powers. The famous economist Leonid Biochesky believes that the Brix gathering is more than a political gesture, but a threat and bargaining tool.

In the area of strengthening the role and position of global leadership, and impose the will and vision of Russia in the management of crisis and international problems, Russia is active diplomatic force in talks to resolve the problem of the West-U.S. nuclear dispute with Iran in 2015 and the crisis of political transformation in Syria. The last two crises are linked to the position of Russia’s quest for the world stage and impose its political and economic momentum, changing Russian geography shifted attention to its vital interests in the southern neighborhood and where Iran shared the Caspian oil resources with Russia. Iran is an oil and gas exporting country and Iran is the closest area to access to the Arab Gulf countries with the international energy and weapons trade routes. Iran is starting to be regional power in the Middle East, especially after growing influence in Iraq and Syria. Since 2003, the importance of the State of Syria in the Russian strategy is due to the plans for the transfer of Qatari gas through Syria to Europe, which threatens Russia’s control of the gas market in Europe and weakens its negotiating position in determining prices or other crisis. Syria is easier connection with the Arab political arena in addition to the presence of the Russian military base in Tartous, which gives Russia the possibility of military presence in the Mediterranean.

This requirement in the Russian naval strategy of 2015 focuses on the need for a permanent naval presence for the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean, which will bring Russia closer to or enter the waters of the Red Sea and presence in the Horn of Africa and the Arab South.

On the other hand, the location in the waters of the Mediterranean is close to the Strait of Gibraltar and from it to the waters of the Atlantic, where the wider opening on the borders of the European West and North Africa and the interests of the Atlantic America. Russia is still imposing its vision in dealing with the Syrian crisis.

Russia is working to support the ruling regime on the pretext of avoiding the collapse of the Syrian state and creating chaos, as happened in Iraq after the events of political change in 2003. In the Arab region, Russia is seeking to establish a cartel of natural gas exporting countries with Algeria and Libya so that Russia can control the energy market towards the need of European energy markets.

Russia also moved to Venezuela in violation of the Monroe Principles of 1823 and the Alliance for Progress, which was adopted by the administration of President Kennedy in 1962 and which limits power in the South American continent to the hegemony and power of the U.S. Today, Venezuela is the main partner of the arms trade in America Latin with Russia.

Brazil joined the Brix economic bloc, but the two countries—Venezuela and Brazil, led the policy of forming alliances against the dominance of the U.S. in the South American continent.

In Russia and the United States, nuclear weapons are part of strategic nuclear forces, including ground forces for strategic missions, submarines equipped with nuclear warheads, strategic air launchers equipped with nuclear warheads, and nuclear bombs. Although there are strategic nuclear forces in the armies of the two countries, Russia and the United States are a key element in determining the balance of power between them.

The Russian surface-to-surface missile is composed of three types of missiles: SS-19, known as Steelet, SS-25, known as Tepl, and SS-27, known as Nuclear Charge. The United States relies on its ground forces on the Minutemen-3 and the MX, which in the ground forces are 550 missiles with 500 nuclear warheads.

However, experts and military analysts confirm that there is a disparity between the two countries (the United States and Russia) in the number of missiles and nuclear warheads.

The disparity between the two countries in the number of missiles and nuclear warheads operating within the ground strategic forces is due to the nature of their respective missions, which are determined by the geopolitical location of each country. Russia is a land force that forms the heart of Eurasia, where political scientists gather that those who control it control the world, so its army is limited to protecting this land and trying to break through the sea.

The US military is an Atlantic naval force, whose task is to impose control over Eurasian territory, and to ensure that the naval force is superior and secures global hegemony.

The small difference in the number of missiles carrying nuclear warheads in the two countries' land forces is due to the fact that Russia has to secure the broadest possible protection for its wide prowess and areas of influence. It also relies on the ground nuclear force as a strike force, spreading within areas that can hit its targets at any point in the world, which can not be said about the United States, so it distributes the largest number of nuclear warheads on strategic bombers, and naval forces, which are deployed around the world, in an attempt to balance with Russian.

## Conclusions

After the arrival of elected president—Vladimir Putin, he tries to play the role of global power and to enter strongly in the management of global crisis, impose the Russian vision in international decision-making, and sought to expand the circle of supporters and allies at the global level. For example, the establishment of a gathering and the attempt to set up a cartel for gas producing countries in the world are included. Russia also succeeded in its diplomatic efforts to reach a nuclear agreement between Iran and the Western (5 + 1) countries. The Russian administration continues to take control in resolving the Syrian crisis and rejecting the theory of U.S. to change the Syrian political system by using force and supporting the opposition forces with weapons. Russia has succeeded to a large extent in curbing the U.S. military force to manage the crisis in Syria that Russia in the first quarter of the 21st century has successfully and successfully restored its global role and restore the balance of international power in its favor.

One of the keys to understanding Geo-strategic Russia is to look at its location for the rest of Europe. The European peninsula is surrounded on three sides by the Baltic Sea, the North Sea, the Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Black Sea.

The easternmost part of the peninsula extends from the eastern tip of the Baltic Sea south to the Black Sea. This line also defines the eastern borders of the Baltic States—Belarus and Ukraine. These countries are the eastern edge of the European peninsula. Hardly any part of Europe is more than 400 miles from the sea and most of Europe is less than 300 miles away.

On the other hand, much of Russia is actually landlocked. The Arctic Ocean is far from the population centers of Russia, and the few existing ports cannot be used in the winter.

These geopolitical advantages were and still are elements of strength that strengthen Russia's chances of always being a global center that allows it to adjust the rhythms and movement of international balance of power.

Cooperation between leading states and their associations are in the interests of common tasks. Of course, any logical world leaders would consider the above quote as the basis upon which international relations are built upon. But unfortunately, we have a the "Western" elite feeling the impact of their own mistakes after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, felling the impact, but remaining in denial of what has taken place mainly the fact that the Uni-polar world that they were used to exploiting is no more.

Their tactics of a modern era scorched earth applied mainly in the Middle East but without being limited there. Their tactics of installing puppet governments in other countries, close to vital security zones of their "rivals", their offensive actions of installing nuclear capable missile launchers in an almost unretaliating distance from their same "rivals" shows that they have chosen confrontation instead of cooperation.

The confrontation, which is likely to produce results, will not be thwarted as a result of both Russia and the United States possessing nuclear weapons.

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