

# Turkey After Failed *Coup d'état*: Internal and External Repercussions

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The search for such a topic requires first to be informed of its realistic course and intellectual and historical frameworks as well as a substantive study, in order to analyze more deeply to the content and dimensions of the problem in which we are concerned; we intend to raise the issue and proceed from it to the following question: Is there a conflict between the political wings of Islam in Turkey—the political wing led by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Justice and Development Party (AKP), and the social wing led by the Fethullah Gülen and his movement (service movement)? The answer to this question looks easy, however, the reality of the situation points to the contrary, especially after the AKP swept the majority of voters' votes over the past 10 years, and its individuals and supporters penetrated into most political, economic, and social joints, and during this period, trimmed the nails of opponents and the opposing persons of the state institutions, especially the military, which was the brake and director of any political or security chaos, and the protector of the secular Kemal inheritance, which is not easy to tame; this has raised doubts about the policy that President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will take in front of the service movement after his apprehension by some works done by this movement on the social and cultural actions, which is considered to be of political significance. The last *coup d'état* seemed to have been a heterogeneous mixture and there were disaffected elements and wings on the ruling political elite. Trying to refer to the social and cultural heritage of the Turkish people, among these elements, Fethullah Gülen Group (movement of service) and some groups of the Turkish army are heavily indignant on the AKP and its leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as a result of the party's policies during a short period of political and economic level that led to intellectual transformation of some supporters of the Fethullah Gülen group for the pro-Justice and Development Party. Here, according to Erdoğan's supporters, the latter had captured the feelings and consciousness of large segments of the Turks, especially the youth categories, and even supporters of Fethullah Gülen. The research will highlight the issue in Turkey within and aftermath of the *coup d'état* of July 15, 2016 and consequences of this failed *coup d'état* at the internal and external level, and will answer the following questions: Is the *coup d'état* a process of re-engineering of this geostrategic area? Giving Turkey the vital role it deserves through its new directions in Eurasia, which is the first shield of the West in the region? Or is the *coup d'état* arranged by the government to get rid of political opponents as the opposition claims? Or was it already prepared by the opponents of Erdoğan and the indignant? Is this coup as a plot against Turkey as a state?

*Keywords:* Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Mohammed Fethullah Gülen, Justice and Development Party, Turkish Kurdistan Workers' Party, 15th July 2016 *coup d'état*, geostrategic area

It seems through monitoring and careful readings of what happened in Turkey just before and after the *coup d'état* of July 15, 2016, the country suffers from many problems, including different political, economic, and social levels. There are also forces and movements which do not want Justice and Development Party (AKP) to continue to rule, either domestically or at the regional and global level by the dual nature of the AKP. The party holds Islamic principles and at the same time practices a secular policy, so, some of those powers have been clustered and carried out this attempt with the aim of grabbing power and dropping the government at any cost; this has reinforced the questions raised about this attempt and the actors of it and their internal and external links.

Since 2013, the gap between Erdoğan and Gülen has begun to widen when Gülen entered into alliance with the opposition parties to the AKP, and then Gülen entered into alliance with the Turkish Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) according to Turkish sources. This situation raised many questions about the social and cultural services of this movement, during the events that accompanied the *coup d'état*, which prompted President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to lay down the responsibility for the *coup d'état* on Fethullah Gülen, and he formed a parallel entity for his party and government; he has employed its popular influence through its educational, charitable, and economic institutions to serve his own goals and serve external parties, and these institutions have become so powerful that they can move their masses when they are outraged by the government.

For his part, Gülen wing has been skeptical about the steps taken by the AKP Government towards the movement, by blocking some activities and movements and closing some of the service's headquarters. The leader of the service movement thought that the continuation of the reforms and successes of the AKP at various levels would lead to the weakness of the service movement, despite the services and achievements introduced to the society and the fear that the Government of Justice and Development will freeze their achievements and overcome them; this sense of uncertainty about the government and its actions had precipitated the appearance of differences between the two sides.

Gülen group felt that the ruling party had captured everything with the motives, whether internal or external, which might provoke the wrath of other parties outside the authority. So things went to an escalation, with a third party lurking around, in order to thwart the AKP's experience, the experience of political Islam in Turkey. This party has departed from the conduct followed by the former Islamic-oriented parties, because it has demonstrated its sincerity by moving away from the claim of founding an Islamic State, but calling for freedom of belief in an institutionalized democratic rule; it also pledged to eliminate corruption and had implemented this reform program after receiving the authority with bold steps.

### **The Coup d'état**

It could be said that no one expects a *coup d'état* in Turkey, especially after the elections in the country in 2014, the AKP won by a large majority of about 49%, that is, the government is elected by the people and the President, too, which is a democratic system; who dares to underestimate the popular choice after social and economic achievements and in the area of public liberties and human rights, and reduction of the army's grip and interference in politics.

But we were surprised by an urgent news of Arab and international satellite television that the *coup d'état* occurred in Turkey, the Bosphorus Bridge was closed, the army cordoned off the government's headquarters, and the planes bombed a number of government sites, including the Parliament building, whose members were in a meeting.

It was possible to pay no attention to such events other than Turkey, but in Turkey, it has a special impact, because Turkey is of great importance, a region of meeting and contact zone between the two great religions of the world: Islam and Christianity, and the importance posed to us as Arabs is that it is adjacent to two Arab countries, Iraq and Syria, which are suffering from serious security problems, and relations between them and Turkey are not all right; there are a bundle of problems, including the Kurdish problem, water, Palestine, and others that are still stuck.

The region, which is linked to the country of Levant and the Mesopotamia, has been in an active cultural and social movement, which has enriched the humanitarian culture in most of the era of human history and is thus a bridge between the Eastern and Western cultures (Al-Banna<sup>1</sup>, 2016, p. 165). There were intense battles during the first and second wars.

After the First World War and the overthrow of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey pushed to apply a radical form of secularism, eradicating religion, culture, and national values, so that became a subordinate to Western culture receiving duties without rights and privileges like that got by Germany and Japan, which constituted a crisis of identity in Turkish society. Turkey has become more interested in Europe than Europe's adherence to it. Since the creation of the Turkish state on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire in 1923, it is afraid of disappearing, so it is clinging to its march of joining to the West to protect itself from ingestion from other countries, but it has changed since 2002. Since the rise of the AKP to power which did not say goodbye to the East as Atatürk did but balanced his policy between East and West, where Turkey has provided Europe with a number of services such as its participation in the peace-keeping forces in Afghanistan and its participation in the wars of Bosnia as well as in the Balkans, and stands with the West in striking Iraq.

Turkey has also provided vital services to NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and participated in most of its wars; the West refused it to enter the European Union (which is a Christian forum), citing flimsy reasons and demanding more conditions that deepened the dependency and loss of Turkish national identity (Al-Banna, 2016, p. 166). Until then, many Turks realized that the European Union, a Christian organization had no place for their country with Islamic human weight in this organization, despite the huge concessions they have made to the European Union; it has not succeeded to gain its membership.

In the face of these European attitudes, the Turks felt that they have been disadvantaged and marginalized despite the sacrifices they made to the West, albeit at the expense of their values, history, and relations with their brothers in Islam.

This situation and the application of secularism have led to a broad range of Turkish people to review their positions, and their embrace of political movements with social and religious orientations. The application of democracy in Turkey came to the benefit of Islamic-oriented parties, which began since 1950, but it was not radical changes; it was the beginning of the wide-ranging changes that Turkey had seen in the 1995 elections, that led to the rise of the Welfare Party led by Necmettin Erbakan's top-level vote, but he could not form the government alone, and the army was not comfortable with its leader Necmettin Erbakan (Kareem, 2013, p. 141). In 1997, Erbakan was forced to resign in the post-modern *coup d'état*. Or after political Islam, after the Turkish National Security Council passed a resolution to dissolve the Welfare Party, the Constitutional Court affirmed the ruling on dissolving the party, and its leader Erbakan has been barred from political action for a period of five years. A number of party leaders were able to form a new party called the Virtue Party led by Ismail

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<sup>1</sup> Dr. Fouad Al-Banna is a professor of Islamic political theory at the University of Taiz in Yemen.

Alptekin, who gave up the leadership to Recai Kutan in the party congress held in May 1998<sup>2</sup>. But this party has not lasted long as it was also banned. The youth cell of the Felicity Party formed a new party in August 2001, the AKP, which was allegedly led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Davutoğlu, 2011, pp. 474-475).

In the 2002 elections, the AKP won a majority of votes and formed the Turkish government. During the handover of the authority, the party has faced several problems, and we will address some of them as follows.

### **First: The Kurdish Issue**

The Kurdish problem is a major dilemma in the front of the AKP government, and after the strides made by Erdoğan government to solve this problem, it resurfaced again to float on the surface of the events. The follow-up to this problem and its repercussions reaches an extremely important issue; there are internal, regional, and international forces which were not happy to stabilize the situation in Turkey, and are willing to weaken its resolution to play a role in the regional ocean, especially after its orientation to play a major role by linking Eastern Europe to Central Asia. This is what the former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu has said, which considers the Middle East region containing areas of contradiction between international borders and the elements on the ground (Davutoğlu, 2011, p. 481). This situation has been compromised by the flimsy walls. The Kurdish problem has not been beyond the framework of determining the interest beyond the concept of the political boundaries of the great powers, which strengthen its influence through a *de facto* policy with the alleged protection of Kurds, where the Kurdish issue has become an element of ambiguity in the region, which is an international and regional competition area. The foremost ones of those competition forces are the United States of America, European forces, and Russia. This issue will continue to be a matter of tension and influence within the three important arenas in the Middle East, the geo-cultural and geo-ethnic foundation of the Kurdish question represented in the revolutions and uprisings of the Kurds. As the spread of the Kurdish component within the arenas of the three important stable elements in the Middle East, Turks and Arabs who are also the great powers will seek to benefit from the Kurds in the strategic equation in one way or another.

The Kurdish issue became an Iraqi problem and an Iranian issue after the Iranian revolution and then a Turkish issue as a result of the armed activities of the Turkish PKK. Turkey is deeply disturbed by the policy of America and Europe and their positions on the Kurdish issue, particularly its effects on Turkish relations with Germany and Greece (Herman, 2012, p. 202). The Kurdish region had briefly witnessed a stable situation after contacts had been made between the parties to the Kurdish problem. However, situation changed in 2006, when the PKK ended the truce, after issue of arrest of its leader Abdullah Öcalan on February 15 of the same year, who was hiding political goals by calling for a resumption of fighting against the government, of these objectives: firstly, fear of losing control of the Kurdish movement in the new political process; and secondly, the fear of the increased influence of some competitors, especially after the Kurdish deputies who had been arrested went out of jail. There was a power struggle within the PKK and the third heightened fear of the organization from winning AKP in six Kurdish provinces in 2004 and then a conflict between the party

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<sup>2</sup> Needless to say, the late Erbakan would never have happened to him because his attitudes manifest hostility to Zionism and Freemasonry, and he gave the Arab-Turkish relations special significance by virtue of the relations of Arabs and Turks of the bond of religion and belief. In August 1980, a bill was submitted to the government demanding to cut relations with Israel. His proposal was to withhold confidence from the Foreign Minister Khaier Edeen Arkmanz because of his pro-Israel attitude and anti-Arab policy, and during his presidency of the government, he tried to close the Masonic forums and the Lions clubs. Erbakan (mercy of God) died on 27 February, 2011 in a hospital in Ankara [Saleh, M. (2012). *Najm Eddin Erbakan and his role in Turkish politics* (1st ed.). Beirut: Arab House for Science Publishers. Pp. 295-298. Karim, M. A. *From the caliphate to modernity*. Pp. 145-147].

members; Othman Öcalan, the youngest brother of Abdullah Öcalan, demanded to transform the PKK into a political organization, but his competitor, Murad Kadilan, who led 5,000 fighters and holed up in the Iraqi Qandil Mountains, refused to turn the PKK fighters into political action. From there, Kurdish fighters launched their military operations against the army, police, train stations, and Turkish airports after returned, as they called the Freedom Hawks, to military action<sup>3</sup> (Herman, 2012, p. 201).

Erdoğan has promised a solution to the Kurdish issue by further freedoms, as well as the abolition of the death penalty, and the lifting of the state of emergency from the Kurdish provinces, where Erdoğan rejected a request from the army in 2006 (Zorker, 2013, p. 458). The Counter-Terrorism Committee, which is composed of army generals, has to impose a state of emergency in the Kurdish region, coinciding with the arrest of Öcalan in February 2006. And the PKK declared a popular revolt against the Turkish government (Abdul-Hakim, 2013, p. 80).

However, these calls for the revolt against the government met with strong opposition from Kurdish personalities and parties, who refused to revolt against the government of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, including Ahmet Türk, Chairman of the Kurdish Democratic Society Party, and Osman Baydemir, Mayor of Diyarbakir, and also stood against the trend of intellectuals who had moved away from the PKK and demanded a Kurdish policy without violence, such as Abdul Malik Furat, Diyya Akini, and Umit Furat<sup>4</sup> (Novell, 2010, pp. 80-81). The Kurdish issue has also become a cause of a reversal of the democratic process, and the military operations of PKK have halted the process of democratic transition in Kurdish areas.

This was not just the case, but it withdrew the Islamic government's dealings with the Kurdish movement and contained the threat of Kurdish separatism in northern Iraq; in Turkey, it is looking for more complicated reasons for Turkey's prestige and its position in the Middle East as an emerging regional power, and the need to position in the geo-political environment about the difficulties and disappointment of the EU accession process (Novell, 2010, p. 81).

The Turkish government has relied heavily on the cessation of fighting in Kurdish areas and moved to deal with the economy and created new jobs for its applicants. It believes that this is done through the development and reconstruction of the Kurdish areas and the cessation of the military's involvement in the political matter. However, the secular and nationalist people were opposed to this and believed that lenient abuse with the Kurds

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<sup>3</sup> The Turkish Kurdistan Workers' Party is world known as PKK. From radical organizations, constituted by Abdullah Öcalan in 1978, this party was not the only party to Kurds; there are less important and more ideological groups. The Iraqi National Democratic Party, led by Massoud Barzani, has provided a cover for the work in the territory and carried out several military operations against Turkish railway stations and airports. In response to this organization, the Turkish government has armed more than 18,000 Kurds, who were called the village guards in 1986 to deal with the party's attacks; the party, however, launched an intensive campaign in 1987 to kill a large number of them with their families [Zorker, E. (2013). *Modern history of Turkey* (1st ed.). (A. Al-Hares & D. A. Al-Islami, Trans.). Beirut: Al-Madar Al-Islami House for Publishing]. More than 3,000 villages were evacuated in southeastern Turkey after the Labor Party's campaign. In the face of this Turkish military, Massoud Barzani changed his tactics in the war against militants of the party by taking positions in mountainous areas. The party leader was then Abdullah Öcalan who lived in Syria, after the pressure was exerted on the Syrian government, he left for Kenya, then to Russia and after that to Rome where he was placed under house arrest; after failing to go to Germany and the Netherlands, he was transferred to the Greek island of Corfu. The Greek government, fearing that its relations with Turkey had deteriorated, sent him to its embassy in Kenya, and when Öcalan left the embassy complex, a team of Turkish elite forces kidnapped him; he was jailed on an island in the Marmara Sea and sentenced to death by hanging, but the sentence was eased because Turkey abolished the death penalty in response to the demands of the European Union.

<sup>4</sup> In the 1993 summit meeting, the European Union (EU) set three political, economic, and social criteria (the state must have the institutions required to maintain democratic governance and human rights and an active market economy and the state's pledge to implement the EU's commitments and intentions and the criteria for membership were set up in Copenhagen conference, held in June 1993, Denmark).

would lead to their secession and formation of a Kurdish entity in the region. These fears have increased after the gains made by the Iraqi Kurds being independent as a *fait accompli* by encouraging of Americans and weakening authority center in Iraq. However, Erdoğan has been moved to find a solution to the Kurdish dilemma through legal proceedings and invoking the Copenhagen standards as Europeans adopted as a condition for entry into the European Union (Abdul-Hakim, 2013, pp. 180-181).

Erdoğan was able to enact the law on the right of the individual to access information, the right of minorities to learn in their own language; Kurds were able to obtain television broadcasts, magazines, and newspapers in the Kurdish language, which formerly was prohibited, and some political analysts believe that the AKP and its leader Erdoğan, through his reforms, are more advanced and closer to the people and their vital interests of all other right-wing and leftist parties in all their categories (Davutoğlu, 2011, p. 481).

Despite those actions, the Kurdish arena, whether in Iraq, Turkey, or Syria, will remain open to all kinds of exploitation, with the Kurdish component of the three countries being exploited by the great powers. Turkey is deeply disturbed by the policy of those forces from the Kurdish issue, which has become an area of foreign intervention. This sentiment was heightened after the meeting in Washington of Kurdish leaders in Iraq without informing the Turkish side, which may be as a punishment for Turkey for refusing to use the Incirlik Air Base intensively against Iraq in 2003 war (Al-Obaidi, 2015, p. 252). Here, if the concerned parties wanted to solve the outstanding problems through the convening of a regional conference of the parties involved in the problem, by resolving it radically and not allowing for it to remain unresolved, a solution would satisfy the interests of all parties to the problem. The solution appears to be near in Turkey, especially after the formation of a government in a strong position, which is likely to be allowed to impose political control on the state apparatus, including the army, and this could be the beginning of Turkey's transformation into a real civil society; taking into consideration the interests of the citizen and society, it is within this context that the Kurdish problem is resolved through democratization and action to guarantee the rights of the Kurds and other citizens; this will show that democracy is possible to establish in an Islamic society, contrary to what some Western thinkers think not to be able to establish culture democracy in Islamic countries.

There is no doubt that all liberal measures and liberalism of political climate and legislation enacted by Turkey were due to its desire to become a full member of the European Union, despite the fact that Europe has distanced itself from Ankara and calls for the implementation of conditions outside the rapid implementation capacity, including the modernization of Turkish society, solving the Kurdish issue, and the achievement of accepted levels of development.

### **Second: The Service Movement (Fethullah Gülen Group)**

The service movement now formed the second important issue of the Turkish government after being accused of participating in the failed coup. The more than half a million students of Al Noor school (Nawras) were split, after the death of their Sheikh Badeea Al-Zaman Al-Norsi in 1960, into several categories; some of them supported the National Safety Party, others supported the Motherland Party or True Path Party and some continued to refuse to turn the movement into a political party, citing that it would remain for all Muslims and not for a particular party or class. And from those groups, the group of Muhammad Fethullah Gülen (Al-Din, 1997) was one of the most prominent socio-cultural groups that began work in the beginning of the 1970s, however, the group has often continued to support Islam-oriented political parties, including the National Safety Party, led by Sheikh Al-Islam political leader Necmettin Erbakan, who was gradually establishing for

the future plan intellectually and organizationally. Gülen issued journal (*Ceez Bitni*) in 1978, took a way to promote his ideas of faith and philosophy, and then *Azzaman* newspaper belonged to him since 1988 (Al-Din, 1997).

The impact of Sheikh Al-Norsi is evident in the ideas and issues of the service community, and the group has published, translated, and explained the ideas, speeches, and manuscripts of Sheikh Al-Norsi in very elegant volumes (Al-Nuaimi, 2016, p. 111). Sheikh Al-Norsi was the leader of a faith movement that pays special attention to build the personality of the individual and society, i.e. the goal is to Islamize the society after years of extreme secularism, and its purpose is to bring up a successful believer generation linked to his society. The Gülen movement was going along the same lines, and in this Gülen says: “We are not here as Turkish Muslims to put ourselves in the service of Islam, but to put Islam in the service of Islam and in the service of life” (Herman, 2012, pp. 169-170).

Here, as the service community declares, Gülen wants to lead people to modernity without abandoning their faith against that modernity. Therefore, the Gülen incorporated the faith and its traditions into modernity systems, where Gülen sets three objectives for the realization of what he wants as follows:

- (1) He seeks a modern Islam, combining Turkish civilization with Western civilization, and seeks to entrench Islam among the Turks in Europe (Herman, 2012, p. 170);
- (2) Gülen tried to find Turkish Islam in harmony with European civilization;
- (3) He also sought to establish dialogue between Turkish Muslim and other religions.

He was the first religious leader trying to establish a distinguished relationship between Islam and other religions; he has established privileged relations with many non-Muslim religious personalities, and visited the Ecumenical Patriarch (Bartholomew I), president of the Orthodox Christians at his headquarters in Istanbul. He also visited the Pope (Johannes Paul II) in Rome. He met with the religious leader of the Sephardi Jews, the rabbi (Eliyahu Bakshi-Doron) in Istanbul. The aim was to create or open quiet dialogues with other religions, which have been interpreted by opposing parties as contacts aimed at compromising the security of Turkey.

In intellectual terms, Gülen focuses on a very important issue, namely, that Muslims must avoid to establish an Islamic system of government, and Muslims live as individuals because Allah will inspect people according to their work and not to the system of government in which they live, and that education has to be transferred to a modern science; morality should be given a moral basis for conduct, arming with both two.

A contemporary man can make up the world, preserve his identity as a Muslim, and within his vision of religion, Gülen believes that religion is essential and is behind every development, which makes human values (Herman, 2012, pp. 170-171). In a press interview with the newspaper *Al-Zaman* published in March 2004 in 10 series, he said that “Islam has no obstacle to democracy, and democracy needs a metaphysical dimension, which Islam can provide, there could be Democratic Muslim, as there are Christian, Jewish, and Buddhist democracies”. Gülen also calls for people to discuss their demands freely and abandon their prejudices, so it was not possible to dispense with the same rights for all, that he wants an open Islam to the experiences of all times and everywhere (Novell, 2010, p. 66).

In this, he was impressed by what happened in his country where any exclusion of any government emerged from Atatürk’s principles and democratic principles, and the policy had aroused a new approach to the concepts of the Islamic Movement, liberal democracy on the way (German or American way) by maintaining the moral level and giving religion a wide place in the public domain (Gül, 2016, p. 128).

Gülen had sought and stood for the support of the AKP in the 2002-2006 elections, where he supplemented the Justice Party by additional votes, and the Gülen community had claimed with many privileges that were done for this group, where its supporters entered the judiciary, education, the army, and the police, and Erdoğan gave them plots of land to make charitable projects; the Gülen community continued to lobby the AKP, demanding more concessions even if it was at the expense of other groups of the Turkish people, which led Erdoğan to face those demands, resulting in acrimony between the AKP and Gülen group (Gül, 2016, p. 129); and at another level, the relations between the two sides were taking another dimensions, including but not limited to a striking position. Fethullah Gülen blamed the Turkish state for the incident of the Marmara ship, whose owners wanted to break the economic blockade on Gaza Strip, while Israeli planes bombarded them, destroying them and killing nine Turkish citizens. Gülen told the US daily Wall Street Journal that the Turkish side was mistaken because the ship did not obtain prior permission from Israel to enter Gaza, calling it an infringement of legality. Turkish Muslims and other citizens were shocked by the incident. The actions of Israeli government against the citizens of Gaza have aroused their anger and indignation.

It is recalled that Fethullah Gülen was influenced by the Alnurset movement, and he was teaching the books of Sheikh Al-Norsi, and continued in this work, but he departed it when he left Turkey to the United States in 1999 on a treatment trip; he settled there after ruining his relationships with Erdoğan, and then taught his books, personal writings, and ideas, especially after he settled down there. Since that date, the suspicions to Gülen and his followers began to appear about his relation with the Turkish intelligence, and it is the one that offers him the facilities he enjoyed, especially since he was showing a competitor to the movements of Turkish political parties with Islamic tendencies (Gül, 2016, p. 132).

There are those who question the social, cultural, and religious role that is hidden behind the Gülen movement because it is looked at with suspicion and mistrust, especially by the AKP and its leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and other forces within the country. In the view of those forces, the Gülen group is carrying out its social and cultural work, which is only a cover for other things to do in the shadows.

That is why the Turkish people should put this movement in the circle of suspicion, and a religious movement is not entitled to cooperate with a military coup aimed at the Islamic Movement. Because this leads to doubt about the intentions of this movement, it is either subordinate to some of the positions of power within the Turkish army or that a foreign force was dictated by coup leaders and the army, and not to face Gülen's movement, and give it a special activity, and not monitoring it on the intelligence level, this was the case of the *coup d'état* of September 1980, where the movement has left to practice its cultural and charitable works, which means that the movement has shifted from that time to a secret political movement<sup>5</sup> (Gül, 2016, p. 133).

Relations with the ruling military and security institutions are internal, especially after the military coup and foreign relations with America make this movement political more than pure religious one; and the Gülen movement, as researcher Mohamed Zahid Oglu goes, transformed since that time to a parallel entity movement in the exchange of pressure and blackmail with the official Turkish government and with the deep state of

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<sup>5</sup> The movement of service has allied with the Republican People's Party in the parliamentary and presidential elections after 2014, but has not been able to change much of the political map in Turkey, and despite its alliance with opposition parties, however, it remained within the country's admissibility, but after its alliance with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in the 2014 June elections, it began to raise doubts about the alliance, but it could turn into a pressure tool with an external force that could work to raise problems within Turkey, or Gülen may work with internal forces against the government. Turkish government parties have accused Gülen that he has contacts with foreign parties and forces operating against Turkey [Gül, M. Z. (2016). Fethullah Gülen between originality, modernity and betrayal. *Strategic Research Journal*, p. 134].



Turkey (Moawad, 1998, p. 76). Since 2013, the Turkish intelligence discovered that service movement is spying on Turkish officials and citizens.

The Gülen group was accused of using their influence in favor of the community in state institutions and not for the interests of the state. The issue of eavesdropping is problematic in Turkish politics, which has been problematic for three years. Since the discovery of wiretapping, as well as accusing some institutions of being hacked by the Gülen community, such as the Justice Foundation and Administrative Tribunal, the Constitutional Court has become a burden on the state. The Supreme Military Court and the Supreme Administrative Court were abolished in the referendum on the last constitutional amendments of last April.

### **The Army and Its Role in the Failed Coup**

It is known that Turkey has been making by Turkish army since the war of independence and so far, where this army represents the safety valve for secularism and Atatürk inheritance in the country; the army had carried out a number of *coups d'état* under the pretext of maintaining the Atatürk principles in the country. Many governments have been dropped even if there is little doubt about fundamental changes in their orientation, especially if they are Islamic, however, other policies appeared to the surface that have tried to limit the intervention of the military in political affairs that have come to the fore, as these practices weaken the army's strength and make it to intervene in conflicts that are indispensable.

In the past, the army had often used the law to impose a ban on Islamic and Kurdish parties and harassed companies where the military had used the judiciary (Constitutional Court) as a means of dissolving the Welfare Party and the army generals used the media to indict Turkish Islamic companies on charges (financing fundamentalist movements) (Fairouz, 2000, p. 291).

The Constitutional Court became a major nuisance for governments, whose main function was to review the constitutionality of legislation, and became a very important and controversial institution<sup>6</sup>. The Constitutional Court has great power over the actions of parties, personalities, and companies. The National Security Council is more important because, under the Turkish Constitution of 1982, it is responsible for Turkish national security, and it issues its decisions to the government, and those decisions are binding for it and if they are not implemented, the government will be dismissed (Preparation Directorate, 2016).

In the face of this, President Erdoğan is trying to neutralize the army and to remove it from politics after it has maintained for nine decades, exercising the function of protecting the Constitution and the principles of Atatürk.

Shortly after the failed military coup, President Erdoğan announced that the operation (failed coup) was the kindness of Allah Almighty to cleanse the armed forces of anti-democratic elements.

This attempt led to the ruling of the AKP's grip on the military, to remove the army from politics, and to make it professional to remain the protector of the country. However, this policy has not lived up to many military and political parties, and accusations moved to Erdoğan that he is seeking to establish a parallel army of the Turkish army, where its majority are young people, as well as young immigrants. It could be said that Erdoğan had created a "counter-coup" in the next day, starting with radical changes under the pretext of

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<sup>6</sup> Under the Turkish Constitution of 1982, the National Security Council consists of the Prime Minister, the Chief of General Staff, the Ministers of Defense, the Interior, and the Foreign Ministry, the leaders of the main branches of the armed forces, and General Commander Al-Jenderma (internal security). It is held monthly under the presidency of the President and, in his absence, the Prime Minister assumes his mission.

clearing them out of the parallel entity members. A new security and justice apparatus was created and the military and supreme judiciary leaders who participated in the failed coup were overthrown under the pretext of purifying the army from the parallel entity (Ayhan, 2016).

Two members of the Constitutional Court, namely, Alparslan Altan and Ardal Tarjan, were arrested and it issued the decisions of the arrest of 48 members of the State Council and the issuance of arrest warrants has been against about 3,000 judges and prosecutors, the deportation of 10,000 policemen, the suspension of 15,200 teachers in the Ministry of Education, and the revocation of 21,000 teachers licenses in private educational institutions (Rustam, 2011, p. 7; Alkitan, 2015, pp. 38-39).

Erdoğan had directed a devastating blow to what he called the deep state represented by the Ergenekon Organization, which includes a number of retired Turkish army generals who have continued to control the internal political matter in various ways, and they have been implicated in previous *coups d'état*; they were sentenced to prison but were retried and acquitted.

The AKP has been planning to implement democratic reforms with a goal to join in the European Union; the 2004 constitutional amendments to the National Security Council, the status of the military and its role in political life, which were significantly curtailed by its role, were as well as the 2007 constitutional reforms concerning the position of president of the republic and the Great Turkish National Council; and the amendment of the Constitution of 2010 concerns political reform, the development of civil military relations and democratization, ethnic relations, liberties, etc.<sup>7</sup>.

TV channel of CNN Turk has confirmed that the coup was run by the Turkish General Military prosecutor with the support of 46 high-ranking Turkish officers and the news of Turk Channel mentioned that the presumed coup leader was the former commander of Turkey's Air Force (Akın Öztürk) and member of the Constitutional Court (Alparslan Altan) was arrested and poets, journalists, attachés, and diplomats were arrested including the Turkish military attaché in Kuwait (Mikael Oglu) appointed by coup leaders as director general of the chemical and mechanical industries corporation of the Ministry of Defense<sup>8</sup>.

### **Internal Repercussions of the Failed Coup**

For the first time in the history of the Turkish Republic, people are going down to the streets and dropping the coup after two hours of announcing it, supporting the opposition parties of the AKP, such as the Republican People's Party, the protector of Atatürk inheritance, and the conservative Nationalist Movement Party and the pro-democracy media; and the police forces have stood alongside the state.

At the International Energy Conference, held in Istanbul on October 10, 2016, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced his rejection of the criticisms that Turkey had suffered by addressing the operators the *coup d'état* and the conference to support Turkey to eliminate the terrorist organization and noted that his country was facing this organization and the organization of the PKK and *Daesh* and Turkey lost 240 martyrs in this attempt<sup>9</sup>. Analysts and political observers believe that the *coup d'état* has come to strengthen the power of the Justice Party and his leader Erdoğan; the problems that work within the policy to a recent era have been overcome, with the government taking several positive steps to improve relations with the opposition.

<sup>7</sup> Al-Mashreq Al-Iraqia Newspaper no. 3536, number issued on July 19, 2016.

<sup>8</sup> Proceedings of the *International Energy Conference*, Istanbul, October 10, 2016, Arabic satellite, Bulletin of 3 P.M.

<sup>9</sup> Turkish news agency, published on July 16, 2016.

Developments accompany the failed *coup d'état* and its consequences that the situation of Erdoğan and his party had increased after the *coup d'état*, and removed, isolated, and imprisoned most opponents in the army, police, air force, navy, and presidential guard; many judges, professors, and a number of diplomats were retired.

It is striking that these procedures, deportations, and large arrests have not received any opposition or disapproval by opposition parties.

Inevitably, the positions of those parties had not been driven by their affection for Erdoğan or his party, due to giving Turkey's national interest to narrow partisan interests, and because they are interested in Turkey, not Erdoğan. Here, it can be said that President Erdoğan was able to end the power of the secular and Atatürk army, to achieve his ultimate goal of reforming the economy, and to keep the army out of politics; and he was able to do so after the failed coup. Of course, he feared that this would lead to the country's entry into democratic tyranny.

The repercussions of the coup at the domestic level are also the attribution of the government's presidency to Binali Yıldırım who has the experience and statesmanship of foreign policy after the former Prime Minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, refused to accept any position in Erdoğan's government. In fact, the choice of Yıldırım was an internal movement to rearrange the paperwork inside Turkey and he benefited from this situation to get rid of Erdoğan's opponents. The AKP became as the Republican People's Party in Mustafa Kemal Atatürk era, the founder of the Republic of Turkey.

Perhaps, the most important implication of the failed *coup d'état* is the fact that the Turkish government has accused the movement of service and the Al-Norsi group of participating in the *coup d'état*; it has cleared cultural institutions and arrested most of their leaders who belonged to the army, the police, all military sectors, the judiciary, education, and other institutions. More than 130 media outlets have been closed in the Gülen community, and 16 satellite channels and 45 daily newspapers were closed, including the famous Al-Zaman newspaper and 23 publishing houses; and there was demobilization of 2,400 military personnel, including high-ranking officers, the closure of 934 schools, 109 residences for students, 15 universities, 1,125 associations, 19 teachers union, and 35 health institutions<sup>10</sup>.

The researchers in the Turkish situation see that Fethullah Gülen's followers had fallen into trap set up for them since three years, when this group tried to cooperate with certain personalities and the Turkish Public Prosecutor, and brought charges of corruption to some ministers in the government of Erdoğan. Through those charges, the AKP was able to discover that the Gülen group was spying on government administration and military institutions so the coup was as an opportunity for the party to pounce on service movement or what Erdoğan called the parallel entity.

The AKP believes that the July 15 movement was a proactive movement by the Gülen group to hit Erdoğan and the ruling party to avoid their removal (Gülen group) from the army and other state joints, in addition, the position of some generals in the army does not like the control of civilians. Erdoğan stressed that what happened is an insult to the state's prestige and a crime punishable by law. The failure of the *coup d'état* to achieve its objectives shows the strength of democracy in the country<sup>11</sup>.

### **External Implications**

Those repercussions were at the internal level, and the repercussions at the external level had led to charge Fethullah Gülen with accusations of dealing with foreign parties, as well as accusing some states of

<sup>10</sup> Al-Mashriq Al-Iraqia newspaper, no. 3537, Wednesday, July 20, 2016.

<sup>11</sup> Al-Mashriq Al-Iraqia newspaper, issue 3535, Monday, July 18, 2016.

providing support for the *coup d'état* indirectly. Were there any external parties involved or encouraging the *coup d'état*?

The Turkish president accused his arch rival (Fethullah Gülen) of masterminding the coup in cooperation with outside parties to implement the failed coup. While Gülen denied all these accusations, he said that he had left Turkey since 1999 and was a resident in America and had been arrested several times by former military coup plotters in Turkey; how could he engage in such a military coup?

Erdoğan was still accusing the Gülen group of being involved in the coup, because the failed coup leader was the former leader of the Turkish Air Force General Akın Öztürk who has a good relationship with the movement of Gülen, classified as a terrorist group by the Turkish government before 2016; according to the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz, Akın Öztürk has served as a military *attaché* for his country in Israel between 1996-1998, as this general later worked (from 1998-2000) as an Air Force Commander and then retired after reaching the age of 64 years, but he remained at the top military council in Turkey (Tgander, 2011, pp. 225-226). These accusations will have repercussions at the external level, particularly on the course of relations with the United States of America, the residence of the Islamic Fethullah Gülen, as well as with Europe.

As it is known, the government of the AKP has been able in complex circumstances in the region to maintain a balanced approach towards all neighboring states, despite the sharp contrasts between these countries, and maintain a moderate approach to the new US administration then led by Obama; it was the first visit to Obama abroad for Turkey. But this policy began to change slowly and began at the Davos Conference (Switzerland), which brought together politicians, businessmen, literati, and other prominent personalities. Attended by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (January 29, 2009), along with Shimon Peres, Prime Minister of Israel, and Erdoğan criticized Israel for the massacre which had committed against Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. When Peres tried to protest Erdoğan's criticism, Erdoğan stepped back to the podium, talking to Peres, saying: We know very well your blood-stained history of children's blood on the shores of Gaza<sup>12</sup>.

This led to the beginning of Turkey's loss of importance in the Middle East affairs, and Turkey's relations with Israel have reached the point that it cannot be repaired. Despite the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two sides following the recent coup attempt, these relations have continued to be chilled. The attempt has sparked some of the world's reactions, especially in the United States and Europe, and the position of Fethullah Gülen may constitute a legal issue between the United States and Turkey; officially Turkey has requested the handover of Gülen and his escorts, but the United States rejected it and demanded legal evidence, and the Turkish Ministry of Justice presented a memo with conclusive evidence to Washington.

In fact, during his visit to Washington, the Turkish Justice Minister handed over documents accusing the leader of the service movement (Fethullah Gülen) and demanding his extradition to Turkey, but it has not yet been decided. The results of the recent US election, won by the Republicans under the leadership of Donald Trump, may have another stance.

When the chief of staff of the United States visited Turkey on August 1, 2016, he met with Turkish officials at the Incirlik base, and rejected the accusations made by some Turkish political and media figures against US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and it is untrue on the ground. The US chief of staff strongly condemned the failed coup. The commander of the US central forces expressed fears that Turkey would

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<sup>12</sup> Anatolian news agency, news released on August 1, 2016.

withdraw from the fight against *Daesh* in Syria, to absorb the displaced persons from Syria and Iraq and to stand as a barrier to their moving into Europe<sup>13</sup>.

Does the issue of Gülen back to Turkey become a pressure paper against America by Turkey? America wants to push its suspicions, especially US and the European countries have stood the indifferent pause of the coup so that the Turks and Erdoğan felt that the West had abandoned them despite the fact that democracy was targeted by the putschists. This position has also been withdrawn even from certain terrorist groups in Turkey. The United States and Europe have not provided the necessary assistance to face millions of refugees in their territories from Syria and Iraq. The failed coup led to a Russian-Turkish rapprochement, reversing the weakening of European and American relations with Turkey, especially after European remarks that Turkey's record after the coup will qualify it to enter the European Union only in 3,000 years at a cynical stance; for Erdoğan, this crisis forced him to apologize to Russia for dropping the Russian plane. The one who dropped it was Erdoğan's enemy with an aim to influence Turkish-Russian relations. But it seems that the United Nations has abolished the consultative status of the service-related organizations and its leader Fethullah Gülen, and Turkey's efforts to curtail the activities of Gülen organizations, after the adoption of this resolution, succeeded in cancelling the consultative status of three organizations linked to the Gülen movement.

It is clear from this rapprochement with Russia after a break between the two sides after the plane has dropped that Turkey has been greatly affected by this rupture; Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia has lifted the ban on Turkish exported products, estimated at \$500 million in 2015 and in the energy sector, the two sides agreed to start the Turkish transportations project as well as the nuclear reactor and the satellite project into space, and Putin said that Erdoğan wants Turkey to be a leader in the region<sup>14</sup>.

The movement of service has not been interrupted by Turkish society; the movement is a sociocultural movement prevalent in Turkey and in other countries, which has schools, universities, hospitals, and workshops with extensions in Central Asian states, Africa, and some Arab countries. The uprooting of them seems to be illogical, because it works for decades and depends on the cultural and social heritage of the students of Al Noor movement and their Sheikh Badeea Al-Zaman Al-Norsi and they have many supporters in most parts of Turkey; their eradication means the uprooting of more than half a million people, which will create imbalance in Turkish society, which has contributed the service movement institutions through their cultural and social programs, and Islam will lose one of his wings because the AKP represents the political wing and the service movement represents the social wing; these arrests and deportations will create enemies of the AKP, and they may be allied with the enemies of Turkey, and this will pose a threat to them. We see that political Islam in Turkey is in danger, yet there is a wrap around Erdoğan and AKP, but this how long will it continue? It is in the interest of Turkey to hold accountable for the defaulting and cause of the damage inflicted on the Turkish people and the most severe punishments should be imposed, but the coverage of the punishment by all members of the service movement will weaken cultural and religious values. It will also negatively affect Turkey's links with its regional and global surroundings. On the other hand, it must be confirmed that the major developments in Turkey at the internal and international levels are exerting great pressure on the Turkish decision makers and on the Turkish people; the crisis in Syria, the entry of the Kurds on the line of that crisis

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<sup>13</sup> The press conference of the Turkish and Russian presidents on the margins of the International Energy Summit, held in Istanbul on October 10, 2016, was quoted by the Turkish news agency and the satellite stations as its news bulletins.

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revived national aspirations, and this will deepen the crisis with seculars, while the rapprochement of Islamists will be closer to the nationalist movement than ever before. And if this is done, the next phase will be the stage of strengthening relations between the Islamists and the Turkish nationalists, and at the expense of the weakness of other forces, especially seculars and Kurds, it will increase the differences between the government and the armed parties of the Kurdish armed movement, considered by the Turkish government as terrorist groups at least ISIS and led to Turkey's intervention in Syria to address the rampant situation of the military arm organization [PYD Democratic Union Party (Syria)], originally linked to the opposed PKK organization, classified in Turkey as a terrorist organization. The intervention aimed at displacing Kurdish militants from the Syrian town of Grabels near the Turkish border. Turkey has launched this campaign (Euphrates Shield) as well as preventing a Kurdish entity in the region threatening Turkish national security and destabilizing the security of the region. In conclusion, it must be said that Turkey has become a state with great effect in its regional area and in the interests of the great powers. Despite the persistence of the Atatürk legacy, which has created a legacy of suspicion between the people and the ruling elites, especially with regard to the intentions of the West about Turkey, it has now changed with a way or other, after President Recep Erdoğan and his administration have approached to the people, through constitutional, economic, and cultural reforms in the country; the Erdoğan's government is seeking always to win the Turkish street by perpetuating the momentum of economic reforms, promoting democracy, organizing political activities, and protecting human rights and the citizen, as the results of these things will be important for Turkey's relations with Europe and the United States of America. Turkey's departure from the West will have a major negative repercussion on Turkey's policy in the Eastern Mediterranean region and Balkan, and will be closer to Russia and the Islam world, to feel unwelcome in Europe.

This requires a rapid processing by Europe and the United States to correct the damaged relations with Turkey, to improve them, and to be working with them in the interests of both sides and the Middle East region and in the case of continued estrangement between the two sides, that will feed extremism against the West and America by armed organizations that are not primarily satisfied with the presence of Western powers in the region; it is also possible for Turkey to get closer to Iran and Russia, especially for the positions of the West of the situation in Syria and Cyprus, which will cause a flaw in that policy and thus lead to the disintegration of the European Union<sup>15</sup>.

Turkish President Erdoğan has also strengthened his position with the consent of the Turkish people to constitutional reforms, which reinforce his powers and increase stability in Turkey, and Turkey's hand will be

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<sup>15</sup> The referendum on constitutional reforms was held and dealt with 18 constitutional articles on April 16, with the reforms being supported by 41.51%, and opposed by 59.48%. The constitutional amendments focused on the transition from the parliamentary system to the presidential system, the abolition of the post of Prime Minister, and the increase in the number of members of parliament from 550 to 600 seats. The age of nominating for general elections has been reduced from 25 to 18 years, with the parliament and presidential term being five years, and parliamentary and presidential elections at the same time. With executive powers and the command of the army, the President has the right to appoint and dismiss his deputies and ministers. He also has the right to submit the laws relating to the Constitution, in the case of a popular referendum, if it is necessary. Under these amendments, the Parliament has the right to request the opening of an investigation against the head of State, its deputies, and ministers. Military courts, including the Supreme Military Court of Justice and the Supreme Military Administrative Court, have been abolished. The establishment of military courts in the country was banned with the exception of the moral courts. The amendments were opposed by the Republican People's Party and the Kurdish Democratic People's Party, and the Fethullah Gülen group; the Republican People's Party was the initiative to put these amendments in general (1937), but the illness of its leader Mustafa Kemal Atatürk had prevented him from being made, and then his successor, İsmet İnönü, came to the authority to overlook to do it. The Arabic-speaking TV channel news (TRT) bulletins for April 16, 2017. Al Anadol news agency, bulletins on April 18, 2017.

freed on a multi-policy basis, both with Iran and Russia, to achieve cooperation in regional affairs and the gulf region to defend the common security objectives of the states. The region is likely in such a situation to see the relations with the West in notable tension, especially if the European right parties come to power like France, Germany, etc. because those parties call for the expulsion of migrants from their countries and because Turkey retains the largest community in Europe; Europe should be cautious in dealing with these issues, especially the issue of immigration, Syria, Cyprus, and the Kurds may have adverse international conditions. The AKP works with National Movement Party (MHP), by matching their positions against the failed coup, also matched their vision during the last referendum, to show some kinds of stresses in its foreign policy towards the West. Turkey may emerge as an emerging regional force that affects the course of events in the Middle East and the Balkan; especially the Turks have hopes to restore the Ottoman glories.

### Conclusions

From the events and consequences of the Turkey failed *coup d'état*, we can conclude that Turkish people have established the democratic principles and they became hostile to the military coups, also they began to seek for a democratic regime. That failed coup led the AKP to lose its absolute majority and influenced the relations between Turkey and the European Union with the central Asia countries.

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